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Sebastian Heilmann

TURNING AWAY FROM THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION:

Political Grass-Roots Activism
in the Mid-Seventies



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Dr. Sebastian Heilmann is researcher at the Institute of Asian Affairs, Hamburg

During the violent excesses of the late sixties (1966-68) and the ensuing massive political persecutions (1968-72), Chinese society had virtually been crippled. It had split into estranged fragments: reluctant workers worrying about their livelihood; opportunistic, bullying cadres; disillusioned, cynical youth; and mute and frightened intellectuals. In the seventies, violence, crime, infighting within work units, a declining work morale and official corruption contributed to the picture of a severe social crisis that resulted from the mass factional strife of the Cultural Revolution.¹ Chinese society had lost its cohesion as the Communist Party (CCP) had lost it in the struggles of the late sixties.

The social crisis was exacerbated by political conflicts on all levels of the Party hierarchy. Rival groupings within Party committees tried to instrumentalize social tensions for their factional interests. As a result of the cleavages within the Party and state apparatus, public order and the authority of the Communist Party could not be entirely restored in spite of the massive political purges, rustication campaigns and other reprisals carried out under military guidance in the years after 1968.²

During the seventies, factional cleavages dating from the late sixties still dominated much of the political scene. But the complexity of local struggles and the fact that official campaigns were used by all different political forces to further their particular interests allowed some leeway for political activities that went beyond the old factionalism. To a certain extent, the divisions in the Party apparatus permitted and stimulated certain forms of spontaneous and sometimes overtly deviant political activism.

Dealing with factionalism and grass-roots activism in the seventies, one important qualification is appropriate from the very beginning: the Chinese were not a people of dedicated political activists or even resistance fighters in the seventies. There is no reason to exaggerate the numbers of people actively involved in factional strife or in grass-roots protest and dissent. If there is at all anything like a rebellious continuity in Chinese political history, it is carried on only by a small minority of courageous people who dare to grasp opportunities for political articulation and, under rare exceptional circumstances, become capable of mobilizing mass support. In the

early and mid-seventies, the mainstream of political behavior was opportunism and cynicism, and not political activism. This applies to workers as well as to students. Only very few people openly turned *against* the policies of the Party leadership around Mao. Most people turned *away* from politics, as far as this was possible, and tried to back out of it.

The decay of the system of Party-led mass mobilization became evident in the mid-seventies. At that time, large proportions of the Chinese populace saw the Cultural Revolution as the main cause of despotic rule, rigid ideological dogmatism, never-ending political struggles and economic hardship. Most people were fed up with (*yanfanle*) political campaigns and witch hunts. In the seventies, the majority of the Chinese populace returned to their conventional role as middle-of-the-roaders: they sat on the fence watching the clashes between remnant "conservative" and "radical" factional groupings and tried to guess which way the political wind was blowing.³

In addition to the violent excesses and persecutions after 1966, another political event had a very important impact on the way many Chinese viewed their political leadership: the Lin Biao affair. The news that Mao's designated successor had planned a coup against the god-like Party chairman was a blow not only to Mao's mystique as a sacrosanct helmsman but even more so to the political system as a whole. More and more Chinese privately started to blame the system of personalized rule (*renzhi*) as the main reason for China's political misfortunes.⁴ This became particularly obvious in writings like those of the Li Yizhe dissident group which called for the establishment of a socialist legal system as opposed to personalized rule.⁵

Usually the aversion to the politics of mass mobilization and class struggle only resulted in passivity and cynicism. But with the help of our scarce sources, we can detect a thin but steady stream of popular activism, spontaneous grass-roots protest as well as more elaborate forms of dissent that questioned the political goals and methods applied by Mao and his radical following. In the 1976 April Fifth Movement which began as a movement of mourning for the late Premier Zhou Enlai, these uncoordinated isolated activities found an intense and aggregated expression in massive demonstrations calling for an end to the politics of class struggle.

The instances of popular activism displayed during the seventies can be seen in the context of a broader social current towards political

demobilization.⁶ The popular resentment against the excesses of class struggle ran counter to the mobilizational goals of the Maoists in a fundamental way. People who had been relatively easily manipulated in the two preceding decades and had "risen up blindly when called on to do so"⁷ in the late sixties began to obstruct the political manipulation. In the seventies, large segments of society not only turned away from the goals and methods of Mao's Cultural Revolution but also distanced themselves from the official "mass line" practices altogether. The movement regime created by the Chinese Communists lost most of its political efficacy.

The Study of Grass-Roots Protest

This essay attempts to give some answers to the question of how different groups of Chinese responded to or came to terms with the experience of the chaotic and violent period of the Cultural Revolution (if one can come to terms with such an experience at all). Did the populace play a significant and independent role in the political struggles of that period at all? Or can we reduce the history of the Cultural Revolution era to a power struggle within the Party elite during which ordinary Chinese could be used as mere pawns of rival factional interests?

Looking at the developments in the seventies, we can look for new social configurations, political ideas and activities that transcended the cleavages and hostilities displayed during the late sixties. In so doing, we may identify social forces directed towards a different political future and towards a major political re-orientation. Such forces found expression in a number of extraordinary activities in the Chinese society of the seventies: by spontaneous outbursts of grass-roots protest, dissident wall posters and the popular reaction they provoked, demonstrations like the Tiananmen Incident in 1976, but also more subtle forms of articulation such as underground literature.

The historical database for documenting such phenomena is still limited, much more limited than the material on popular activism in the late sixties. The scattered grass-roots activism of the seventies, from the very beginning, has been covered up or subsumed as a manifestation of "bourgeois factionalism" by the official Chinese media and historiography. Indeed, in many cases, it proves to be difficult to distinguish between factional and dissident activity in a clearcut way. During the seventies dissent was very

often articulated by erstwhile members of both "radical" factions (as in the 1974 Li Yizhe case) and "conservative" factions (as in the 1976 April Fifth Movement). It is an interesting phenomenon that dissidents from both sides, even if they had been deadly enemies during the late sixties, arrived at a principal rejection of the policies of the Cultural Revolution. They reached something like a common ground in spite of their very different political backgrounds.

In order to detect a deeper layer of political activism underneath factional infighting, the research that informs this essay started from a local base in Nanjing (Jiangsu Province). Nanjing is important because a number of grass-roots and dissident activities, as well as the second largest 1976 Qingming demonstration, occurred in that place.⁸ But Nanjing is perhaps not very representative for what was going on in other parts of China because factional strife had been quite successfully suppressed in Jiangsu. In general, this province was politically more stable than provinces close to it like Henan, Hubei or Zhejiang, where factional strife made a strong comeback in the mid-seventies. Comparative excursions to such provinces prove to be very important in putting the Jiangsu experience into perspective.

Since it is still impossible for foreign scholars to get access to Party or police archives on the mid-seventies, this study relies on a combination of alternative sources like interviews with Chinese eye-witnesses,⁹ private material held by individual Chinese, local gazetteers and chronicles, regional media and *samizdat* publications from the late seventies. In combination and cross-checked with local mainland sources, reports in certain Hong Kong magazines and Taiwanese intelligence information have also proven helpful.

In studying popular activism in the seventies, one important issue is the periodization of the Cultural Revolution, which has recently become a point of contention among China scholars. Anita Chan has written some thought-provoking essays on this question.¹⁰ From an analytical perspective that takes social conflict and mass activism as its main focus, it is justified to reject the official 1966–76 periodization which has been widely accepted in China and among Western scholars. In terms of popular activism, one can distinguish a period from 1966 to 1968 which was characterized by exceptional opportunities for permissive political mobilization, the formation of mass associations relatively independent of Party control and widespread armed struggle.¹¹

In contrast, from 1968 to 1972, Chinese society lived through a period of repression, persecution and purges that hardly can be seen as a continuation of the mass activism of the late sixties. History took a new turn in the mid-seventies when the factional strife dating from the late sixties was rekindled in many provinces.

For the purposes of this essay, the use of the term Cultural Revolution is confined to the period between 1966 and 1968 when the control structures and organizational monopoly of the Communist Party broke down. The factional struggles of the mid-seventies were different from those of the late sixties in many important respects.

Establishment Radicals and Localized Factionalism

In official Chinese interpretations, the word "factionalism" (*paixing*) is still used as a catch-all term for the different manifestations of social disintegration and disorder in the seventies.¹² In the wake of the tenth Party congress, stimulated by Wang Hongwen's calls to "Go Against the Tide" (*fan chaoliu*) and by the "Campaign Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius," political conflicts dating from the mass factional strife of the late sixties regained momentum in the years of the succession struggle between 1973 and 1976.¹³ Remnants of factional associations became again tangled in frequent clashes between rival groupings, especially among industrial and transport workers in certain provinces. For the first half of 1974, bloody battles can be documented for at least thirteen provinces, Zhejiang, Henan, Shaanxi and Jiangxi being among the worst afflicted.¹⁴

But compared with the late sixties, those clashes were usually on a smaller scale and the majority of the population did not get permanently involved in most places. Moreover, there was considerable variation in the intensity of factional strife between different provinces: In Jiangsu, rebel forces had been virtually wiped out by order of the unscrupulous military leader General Xu Shiyu, who acted according to his verdict that "good guys don't rebel" (*haoren bu zaofan*).¹⁵ Contrastingly, in Henan Province rebel forces made a very strong comeback with the backing of several patrons in Beijing. The local rebel protagonist Tang Qishan temporarily enjoyed the support of the Politburo members Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Hongwen and Ji Dengkui.¹⁶

The factional networks of the seventies were kept together as much by common "fighting experiences" as by competition with rival factions for positions, privileges and power in their respective work units. But there was one fundamental difference in the political standing of the remnant rebel forces compared with the late sixties.¹⁷ Then, they had operated from politically relatively free-wheeling mass associations that stood outside the Party. Starting in 1968, with the help of high-level patrons, a certain number of leading rebel activists were promoted to showcase positions in local Revolutionary Committees. The luckiest ones even ascended to the CCP's Central Committee as was the case for Henan's Tang Qishan in 1969 and Jiangsu's Hua Linsen in 1973.

Many rebel leaders had been denounced and persecuted as "May Sixteenth" elements in the early seventies.¹⁸ But when the political tables turned in favor of the leftists in 1973 and 1974, quite a number of rebel protagonists, especially those who had become members of Revolutionary Committees in 1967-68 but had since been pushed aside, became politically active again. With the help of the Beijing radicals they were appointed to leading positions in revitalized official mass organizations like the Federation of Trade Unions, the Communist Youth League, the Women's Federation, or the People's Militia.¹⁹ From then on, they tried to use their official positions and their Beijing connections to support and direct factional activities from inside a regular institutional basis. In a way, they had become establishment radicals²⁰ operating from within the system of privileges and patronage belonging to the very Party-state they had fought against some years earlier. Though still citing radical slogans dating from the late sixties, the surviving rebel leaders, very much like the hated veteran cadres, were eager to establish a personal power base by cultivating clientelistic relations with their former "comrades in arms" within and outside the Party-state apparatus.²¹

Whereas the rebels' cause had strongly appealed to the underprivileged of Chinese society in the sixties, the establishment radicals of the seventies proved to be much less appealing in most places even if they had been dedicated rebel leaders in the past. The numbers of rebel troops had not only been reduced by persecutions but had also been seriously weakened by the declining appeal of factional leaders and factionalism altogether. Factional cohesion was always jeopardized by internal squabbling as well as by a

lingering desire among the rank and file avoid exhausting political struggles.²²

The clientelistic networks of the radicals, in some prominent cases like Henan or Zhejiang, reached up to powerful patrons in the central leadership. But these patronage networks were not at all tightly knit like a command hierarchy. During the "Campaign Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius" it became evident that the Beijing radicals ("Gang of Four") could not exert effective control over their regional *protégés*. The activities of local factional groupings were driven by momentary and parochial exigencies, only rarely by orders from Beijing.

The Factionalist Challenge

To a certain extent, localized factionalism could still pose a challenge to the authority of the Party in the seventies. Because of disunity within the Party apparatus, factional leaders could afford to ignore or deliberately misconstrue directives and documents issued by the Party center or by the respective provincial Party committees. One of the most self-willed characters among local rebel leaders, Weng Senhe in Hangzhou, publicly said that those who obey all the rules in the world would necessarily ruin themselves. In the seventies, Weng Senhe's disrespect for established social and political norms still had a special appeal to his followers.²³

Regional Party leaders, mostly military men who had actively suppressed any sign of political unrest from 1968 to 1972, took a passive attitude towards the revival of factional clashes (as in Jiangxi) or were themselves deeply involved (as in Henan and Zhejiang). Orders given by Beijing did not make things easier for regional leaders: regional Party organs were ordered to send information and documents on the conflicting groups to the Party headquarters, which had the exclusive right to pass the final verdict on the "revolutionary" or "counterrevolutionary" nature of provincial factions. The dilemma that regional leaders faced in handling factional conflicts was further aggravated by the fact that Beijing leaders, radicals as well as veteran cadres, were actively involved in the manipulation of local conflicts in some regions (e.g. Wang Hongwen in Zhejiang and Li Xiannian in Hubei). In the mid-seventies, regional leaders could never be sure how much support their factionalist challengers really had in the population and at the Party center.

The most serious challenge to the authority of regional Party organs came from those local factions that were firmly rooted in the Federation of Trade Unions, in the Communist Youth League, or in the People's Militia. After the coup against the "Gang of Four," many provincial media complained about tendencies in these organizations to become "independent of the Party" (*xiang Dang nao dulixing*) or even to stand "above the Party." In Jiangsu and Shaanxi, some radical protagonists in provincial Youth League and Trade Unions are said to have coined slogans like: "Party leadership is leadership over the general political line...and not organizational leadership." Some even continued to cite radical slogans dating from the early seventies, when the CCP's primary organizations had not yet been set up in many places: "The mass organizations take the place of the Party" (*qunzhong zuzhi lai daiti Dang*)!

In several provinces, rebel protagonists actually dominated activities of the revived mass organizations for some time in 1974 and 1976. In order to consolidate their position in those institutions they attempted to build up factional "cells," later condemned as "underground organizations" by the official press. In Jiangsu and Hubei, unofficial organizations founded by remnant rebel groupings had only a very loose structure and no stable leadership. Nevertheless, they could create serious problems for the local leadership in times of political uncertainty. The veteran cadres in the provinces particularly feared that the rebels would try to establish cross-provincial connections (*kuasheng chuanlian*) with other radical networks in neighboring regions. Indeed, there do seem to have been regular exchanges between rebel leaders from Zhengzhou and Wuhan.²⁴

The activities of remnant rebel factions sometimes took rather unconventional forms in the mid-seventies. In Nanchang (Jiangxi province), the leader of a local faction which had been in firm control of the local People's Militia headquarters for some time openly challenged the authority of the provincial Party leadership by launching a referendum. In order to demonstrate the broad support his political demands enjoyed among the populace, his followers collected about 150,000 signatures in the provincial capital so as to exert pressure on the provincial leadership. The Nanchang rebels continued to challenge the Provincial Party Committee until autumn 1976, when they held several public demonstrations and struggle processions against individual members of the provincial leadership before finally being suppressed.²⁵

One of the most striking examples of the political robustness of certain provincial rebels can be found in Henan province, which certainly was a stronghold of the radicals in the seventies. When the Railway Ministry tried to discipline the Zhengzhou railway rebels around Tang Qishan in 1975, the local radicals responded with contempt for the orders and displayed remarkable resistance against purges of several of their factional leaders. In 1976, Tang Qishan could afford to decry Railway Minister Wan Li and to reject calls for discipline (i.e. Central Document *Zhongfa* [1975] No. 9) as a "restorative program." In order to exert pressure on the provincial leadership and to provoke a reaction from Beijing, the Zhengzhou rebels blocked railway traffic twelve times in 1976. They justified these blockades with droll slogans like "It is better to be late under socialism than to be punctual under revisionism."²⁶

Judging from such activities, some provincial rebel forces had gained quite an autonomous position in relation to the Communist Party in the seventies. And it is an open question whether certain local rebel factions of the seventies really had the potential to serve as organized competitors rivaling the established Party apparatus. In the late sixties, a trend to become Party-like organizations had been obvious in the internal power structure of several provincial factional mass organizations. They mirrored the structure of the CCP by setting up departments for propaganda, organization, etc. and were understood by the Beijing "Proletarian Headquarters" as potential threats to the CCP's hegemony.²⁷

In the mid-seventies, the revitalized Jiangxi rebel forces apparently tried again to establish a parallel structure rivaling the institutions of the Party-state. In 1974, according to an official source, the Nanchang rebel faction "illegally set up the so-called 'agricultural production headquarters' and 'coal headquarters' and...various leadership groups under all sorts of names. They conferred titles and assigned official posts to their gang brothers and appointed them as 'commanders' and 'heads of groups' and as the so-called 'Assistant to the Political Department of the Jiangxi Provincial Revolutionary Committee' and 'Assistant to the Jiangxi Cultural Office'."²⁸

Besides such rather open attempts to subvert the official power structure in Jiangxi, Taiwanese intelligence reports on political struggles in Henan province claim that, probably after the suppression of their rebel organization, a number of Henan railway workers went underground and founded a "Labor Party" (*laodong dang*) that was active in the early seventies. There

seem to be some allusions to such activities in the provincial media of that time which naturally did not confirm such opposition in detail.²⁹

The emergence of self-willed rebel leaders who dared to oppose orders from the Party headquarters reveals how much the CCP's centralized authority had suffered. Although the Party had largely restored its organizational hierarchy and its claim to a monopoly on political leadership, it occasionally lost control in mass campaigns initiated from Beijing. Factionalism was the main reason why the official campaigns gained a certain uncontrollable momentum of their own. The "Campaign Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius," for example, released unexpected forces in most provinces.³⁰ This can be explained as a direct result of the Cultural Revolution: forms of mass participation that had been easily manipulated until the mid-sixties could lead up to autonomous political activities that were difficult to direct.

In sum, factionalism had a very mixed impact on urban society and politics in the seventies: Most importantly, the endless infighting which was carried on in the name of class struggle contributed to a growing popular aversion towards political campaigns as a whole. Only a minority was still willing to get actively involved in factional clashes in the seventies.

On the other hand, certain remnant rebel forces, especially those led by energetic political entrepreneurs, could pose a limited challenge to the authority of Party committees if they enjoyed the backing of high-level patrons, faced a weak, divided local Party leadership, and had a social basis in local mass organizations.

In connection with the recurrent class struggle campaigns, factionalism was the most important reason why many people took a long time to become aware of their common interest in resisting the political manipulations from above.

Labor Unrest

The divisions provoked by factionalism resulted in a fragmented labor force that was only rarely capable of pushing ahead with broad workers' interests such as higher wages or better working conditions, pressing issues regardless of factional affiliation.

In general, workers had much reason to be dissatisfied with their lot: real wages had decreased by about twenty percent between 1957 and 1977. Younger workers in the lower wage grades were especially hard hit. Their

low working morale became manifest in absenteeism, go-slows, walk-offs, neglect of machinery, theft of factory property and general sloppiness. One Chinese interviewed on these events said: "You foreigners have strikes but our go-slows are even worse." An ironical ballad circulating among Nanjing workers in 1976 put things like this: "When work begins we are worms.... Upon leaving the factory we are dragons." The low morale was not usually the result of organized workers' action but a reflection of a general motivational crisis caused by difficulties with low wages, housing and the food supply as well as by the loss of the factory management's authority.³¹ Workers who demanded higher wages were accused of being influenced by the evil trends of "economism" and "bourgeois rights." Wage policy had been a target of criticism as early as 1966 and 1967, when several workers' organizations complained about their members' paltry incomes.³²

Starting in 1972, the provincial leadership in Sichuan and Hubei repeatedly had to deal with workers who took to the streets demanding higher wages.³³ In 1975, a campaign was initiated to fight these tendencies among the labor force. The anti-"bourgeois rights" drive called for discipline and frugality and sought to convince workers that wages and bonuses were not the most important things in life. These calls, unsurprisingly, were highly unpopular. People did not want to hear admonitions like "work more without caring about wages" anymore. In addition to economic problems, abuses and corruption by cadres were another important source of discontent. Consequently, the 1975 efforts to restrict "bourgeois rights" backfired. They were actually understood by many workers as a threat to their livelihood. Regardless which faction a worker had belonged to, most of them feared an elimination of overtime pay and an even more restrictive policy on wages that had already been frozen since 1963. The Henan provincial leadership actually tried to introduce unpaid weekday labor but met with stiff resistance among the labor force. Workers became restless in many places and blamed radical leaders like Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, who had written key articles on the "bourgeois rights" issue, for disregarding the living conditions of China's workers and for blocking an overdue wage adjustment. To many workers, they represented an irresponsible political leadership that ignored workers' interests.³⁴

From 1974 through 1976, open labor protest was a recurring phenomenon. In most cases, angry workers skillfully made use of official

campaign slogans to camouflage their "economistic" interests. Officially approved slogans like "Down With the Capitalist Roaders" were deliberately used as a means of confronting an unresponsive leadership. Taiwanese intelligence sources document labor unrest in 45 cities during these years. Sources from the People's Republic prove to be highly selective on these events.³⁵

Factional groupings often tried to use discontent among the personnel to foster their particular political interests, for example in opposing local cadres they regarded as their political enemies. Abroad, only the labor unrest erupting in Hangzhou in 1974 and 1975 is relatively well known. Keith Forster has examined this unrest in detail and makes it clear that the Hangzhou events were closely related to local factional struggles. Typical labor issues (wages, working conditions, etc.) were hardly raised by the groups involved although such grievances had certainly contributed to the social tensions in Hangzhou.³⁶

Similarly, the blockades of railway traffic that occurred from 1974 to 1976 almost exclusively had a factional background. Two of the most important railway junctions, Zhengzhou (Henan province) and Xuzhou (northern Jiangsu), suffered from intense infighting in the respective railway bureaus.³⁷ Tang Qishan and Kong Qingrong, the local rebel leaders in Zhengzhou and Xuzhou, tried to present their obstruction of railway traffic as a struggle against "revisionist" forces in the local and national leadership. In fact, they were fighting for their specific factional interests and not for the economic well-being of workers. Nevertheless, in radical strongholds like Zhengzhou, Xuzhou or Hangzhou, rebel leaders were temporarily successful in manipulating workers' discontent to serve their political purposes. In these cities, labor unrest and factional strife became inseparably entangled.

Except for the rebels' strongholds, in most enterprises factional activism was confined to a minority of the personnel in the seventies. Usually, the majority of workers tried to withdraw from political struggles and displayed a passive and cynical attitude. These workers seem to have been roused out of their lethargy only in 1975 when the anti-"bourgeois rights" drive enraged them. The angry response to that official campaign contributed to a more pronounced feeling of having common workers' interests to defend against unreasonable official policies.

In the central Chinese city of Wuhan, labor protests in late spring 1975 (e.g. strikes in the transport sector, in the steel works, in other big factories and sit-ins in front of the provincial administrative building) brought to the surface more concrete common grievances than those manifested in Hangzhou, though in Wuhan factional conflicts also played an important role. Demands for higher wages, better working and living conditions, and better food reflected "economistic" interests that could be shared by workers all over China.³⁸

A similar phenomenon could be observed in Xi'an (Shaanxi province) in the summer of 1976. Intense infighting in the provincial and municipal leadership and attacks on leading cadres by remnant rebel organizations formed the background for a massive labor movement. Under the cloak of rebellion against "revisionist" forces encouraged by the official anti-Deng campaign, diverse groups of workers used the opportunity to complain about specific grievances in their respective work units and about economic hardship.³⁹ Here, intra-elite factionalism created an opportunity for labor protest.

If more general demands were raised by workers in the seventies, they generally had a defensive character. They were a reaction to the often miserable social situation of workers and aimed at solving acute grievances. The outbursts of labor protest in the seventies remained locally isolated. Political control in most enterprises could be restored after a short time. Occasional cases of a more articulate open protest were facilitated by the passivity and factional infighting in the local Party leadership. The scattered acts of collective defiance did not lead to the formation of a broad labor movement or autonomous labor unions.

Grass-Roots Protest Movements

As a result of persistent political infighting within the Party establishment, the CCP's unified authority and organizational control over the population was weakened to a certain extent. During the twists and turns of official campaigns in the mid-seventies, the limits put on popular political activism were not always entirely clear. Divisions within the Party elite and within work units sometimes provided opportunities for raising deviant political opinions and even for holding grass-roots protests, selectively using the slogans of the official political discourse.

During the "Campaign Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius," the borderline between politically deviant and politically acceptable behavior became temporarily blurred. Of course, the extreme arbitrariness in handling political opposition did not end. But the definition of what constituted "counter-revolutionary" activity varied with the ongoing political struggles. In certain cases, dissident activities were shielded or even stimulated by regional Party leaders and used as a political instrument against their rivals. This type of "licensed dissent" is most prominently represented by the Li Yizhe group (see below). Local Party committees and security organs sometimes hesitated to simply suppress spontaneous political activities because they could not be sure which activist had the backing of higher levels and which had not.

In connection with the "Campaign Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius," we find a series of spontaneous political protests that transcended the factional clashes dominating the scene in many places. Such events have received only very limited coverage by historical research in China and in the West. But in the years concerned, we can detect some highly significant popular activities, a Chinese form of grass-roots protest that did not fit into the widespread rivalries between different political cliques.⁴⁰ These were isolated, short-lived efforts to find a new basis for a civilized social life and for a political reorientation after the traumatic experiences of the late sixties.

At this point, it is important to note that protests against the methods, goals and consequences of the Cultural Revolution were not exclusively staged by the "rightist," "conservative" forces already active against the radicals in the late sixties. On the contrary, many protest activities revealed new social and political configurations that went beyond the struggles and cleavages provoked by the Cultural Revolution. Parts of the red guard generation which had been used as the mobilizational basis at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution gradually freed themselves from the political manipulations they had been used for in the late sixties. They proved to be the most important reservoir for dissident activities in the seventies. Then, many erstwhile red guards, former "leftists" as well as "conservatives," openly turned against the lawless authoritarianism of the Cultural Revolution. Many young activists taking the lead in grass-roots protest movements had been stigmatized for their political zeal and for alleged political deviations in the years since 1966. In the mid-seventies, a number of these

people stood up to protest against the injustice and arbitrariness of political persecution and stigmatization. Political activism often crystallized around those victims of the Cultural Revolution upheavals.⁴¹

From 1973 through 1979, many scattered popular protests against cadres' despotism, rustication policy, political persecution and demands for redressing special grievances and for granting political rehabilitation can be documented.⁴² These activities were mostly confined to uncoordinated, isolated outbursts of discontent. Only in 1976, did these activities become incorporated in a national protest movement.

In the following sections, the grass-roots activities of the mid-seventies are summarized under four categories showing how parts of Chinese society actively pulled away from the policies of the Cultural Revolution: protest against political persecution, defiance against rustication policies, attacks on the "red capitalist class" and protests of disillusioned youths.

Protest against Class Struggle Campaigns and Political Persecution

Arbitrary arrests and political persecutions carried out in the years between 1966 and 1972 were a frequent cause of local protests. Successive repressive campaigns ("Purification of Class Ranks," "One Hit, Three Anti," "Suppression of the May 16 Counter-revolutionary Clique") brought terror to large parts of the population, and in particular to leading members of Cultural Revolution mass associations. Under military guidance, millions of Chinese became victims of persecution, numerous political activists were sent to the countryside, thrown into prison, tortured, driven to commit suicide or even executed.⁴³ When the "Campaign Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius" led to a certain relaxation of controls in 1974, a wave of protests against the persecution of previous years surged across the country. Many of those victimized called for political rehabilitation and the redressing of their family's grievances.

In Nanjing, a common cynical saying was that "every family has its counter-revolutionary." It alluded to the arbitrary labeling of political culprits. After the all-powerful military commander Xu Shiyou was transferred to the Guangzhou Military Region in a national reshuffle of high-level officers at the end of 1973, hatred towards the provincial leadership became manifest in many small but significant incidents. During a local mass meeting, one of Xu Shiyou's confidants in Jiangsu province met with a

violent physical attack by angry railway workers who demanded justice for those wronged in the preceding class struggle campaigns. At Nanjing University, which had been hit particularly badly by the repressive campaigns (about one in six of the people working or studying at this university had been suspected of being a "counter-revolutionary"), the chairman of the university's Revolutionary Committee was repeatedly attacked by angry students and teachers. He did not dare to leave his home for some time and was eventually transferred to another province.

An archaic form of protest gained a new life in the mid-seventies: widows' public lamentations and complaints (so-called *guafu shijian*). These widows were women who had lost their husbands during the class struggle campaigns of previous years. They gathered on the streets, surrounded and attacked individual cadres and even laid siege to the homes of those officials in order to force a posthumous rehabilitation of their husbands. The number of women who participated in such activities was not large. But what they did was extremely awkward for the cadres they targeted. One high-level cadre admitted in an interview that some officials had even applied to be transferred to other cities because of the widows' unnerving presence.⁴⁴

In other provinces, demands for political rehabilitation usually seem to have been embedded in local factional struggles.⁴⁵ The demonstrations that occurred in Ganzhou, Jiangxi Province, in April 1974 are relatively well documented. When a young woman (a former red guard leader) put up wall posters to denounce the misconduct of certain local cadres and miscarriages of justice, she was arrested. Some of her friends, former red guards, organized protest marches to demand the woman's release. Several thousand people joined the marches and sit-ins in front of the local Party committee. The protests failed to get her released, however, and the dissident was executed in 1977.⁴⁶

But the events in Ganzhou were not an isolated case. In the provincial media one can find numerous hints that "bad elements" had incited the masses to demand the release of "counter-revolutionaries."⁴⁷ Although many cases had to do with local factional strife, the examples of Nanjing and Ganzhou make clear that grass-roots protest related to political persecution, for some time, was quite a significant phenomenon. During the "Campaign Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius," much hatred was displayed towards those cadres, mostly military men, who were held responsible for the excessive reprisals and executions carried out in the early

seventies. The purges that had haunted the Chinese in the years between 1968 and 1972 remained a very important source of discontent throughout the seventies.

Protests against Rustication

In addition to political persecution and repression, another frequent issue in grass-roots protests of the mid-seventies was the policy to send youth and even entire families from the cities to the countryside. In Nanjing, up to twenty percent of the city's population was affected by the rustication policy in the years from 1968 to 1979. Jiangsu Province became notorious for its excessive "rustication of workers and families" (*gongren xiafang/quanjia xiafang*). Popular opposition against this policy was widely shared regardless of factional affiliation and political loyalties.

In some cases, there were even spectacular public acts of defiance against the official rustication orders. One of the more significant was a demonstration movement involving more than ten thousand rusticated people in Nanjing in April 1974. These people demanded the restoration of their household registration (*hukou*) in the city. They held a day-long sit-in in front of the provincial administrative building, blocked the railway line to Shanghai and started to build makeshift hovels. They even attempted to mobilize Nanjing university students to support their cause. But this effort failed, as the movement was limited to those who had been sent to the countryside. The fortunate city residents had some sympathy for the demonstrators, but they did not come out to openly support them.

The provincial leadership was put in an awkward position: the protests were vehement and the need of those involved obvious. Hence, the Party center in Beijing was asked to give instructions. Beijing ordered the provincial leadership to solve "the immediate problems" of those people, but to postpone any principal questions associated with the unpopular *xiafang* policy.⁴⁸

In 1974, a smaller demonstration directed against rustication policy also occurred in Shanghai.⁴⁹ Violent fights between youths or peasants illegally staying in the cities and security forces trying to send them back to the villages were frequent. One such bloody incident took place in Kaifeng (Henan Province) in April 1976 when a crowd of angry peasants and sent-down youths clashed with the People's Militia. Dozens of people were seriously injured and some are even said to have died.⁵⁰

In some rural areas, illegal organizations of a more comprehensive character were formed by rusticated youths during the seventies in order to fight for their interest in returning to their home towns. In Yunnan and Hainan, some of those groups were accused of instigating peasants and ethnic minorities to rebel against the authorities.⁵¹

In short, the *xiafang* policy was one of the most unpopular policies initiated by Mao and the Beijing leftists. Being sent to the countryside was understood as a punitive measure and not as the only way for a loyal revolutionary, as the official media put it.

Protest against the "Privileged Class"

During the Cultural Revolution, many Chinese had learned about the concealed privileges of Party and state cadres and about official corruption for the first time. The popular image of dedicated leaders selflessly working for the people's cause which had been so carefully cultivated since the fifties was replaced by a deepening distrust of the Party elite. The fact that high-level Party cadres circumvented official rustication policy and used their connections and power to send their offspring through the "backdoor" to factories, army units or universities fueled wide-spread resentment against the "privileged class."⁵²

Since the sixties, many rebel groupings and manifestos had attacked the system of patronage and privileges within the Party-state and within the army. In January 1974, ordinary Chinese got a surprising opportunity to air their discontent with cadres' special status. Zhong Zhimin, a high-level military cadre's son studying at Nanjing University, confessed in an open letter that he had entered university with the help of his father's connections. In order to make up for this privilege-seeking behavior, he asked to be sent to the countryside as a volunteer.⁵³

The Beijing radicals grasped this opportunity for an attack on the veteran cadres by publishing the student's letter in the "People's Daily." A "Campaign Criticizing Cadres' Backdoor Practices" (*pi [ganbu] zouhoumen*) was launched that proved to be popular. Judging by conversations in Jiangsu and Henan, many Chinese obviously still enjoy remembering how high-level cadres started to "sweat" (*chuhuan*) when accused of privilege-seeking during mass sessions. This campaign is not very well known outside China but it is justified to say that it constitutes one of the few anti-corruption efforts in the PRC's history in which popular

participation was deliberately encouraged by the political leadership, albeit for a short time.

The "Campaign Criticizing Cadres' Backdoor Practices" was a small but dynamic movement pushed forward by spontaneous outrage towards cadres who used their positions to gain special favors. Officially, the campaign was restricted to criticizing those cadres who had sent their children to university via "backdoors." But at least in Nanjing, some mass sessions had a tendency to get out of hand and to focus on official corruption in a broader sense. In Jiangsu province alone, two leading members of the Provincial Party Committee were subjected to considerable pressure after being criticized for their "backdoor" methods during mass sessions. In the contemporary provincial media, one can find at least 26 cases of high-level cadres who were criticized by name for their backdoor maneuvers. Suddenly, after having lasted for about one month, the campaign was called off ("postponed") by Chairman Mao himself who responded to intense lobbying by veteran military cadres.⁵⁴

This order could not completely suffocate the critical voices coming from the populace. The suspicion towards the "red capitalist class" and even towards Mao seems to have grown further after the campaign was abruptly called off. This was revealed by a lively but short-lived wall poster movement occurring in Beijing in July 1974. Many posters took up the "backdoor" issue again and openly denounced corruption and privileges among the cadres.⁵⁵

The popular criticism of cadres' privileges can be interpreted as a step towards overcoming the artificial political cleavages and class labels institutionalized by the communist regime. Many Chinese began to see the Party *nomenklatura* as a political class alienated from the people and not as the vanguard of the celebrated proletariat any more. Originally, this line of argumentation had been part of the rebel agenda in the late sixties. Since the seventies, the paradigm of the "red capitalist class" and the "red aristocracy" has exerted an increasingly strong influence on how the Chinese perceive their political leadership.⁵⁶

Youth Protests

The growing popular resentment against official Party ideology and policies reveals one of the major paradoxes left over from the Cultural

Revolution: "What appeared to be the ultimate mobilization of blind faith actually left in its wake independent opinions and profound skepticism."⁵⁷

Many young Chinese who had enthusiastically taken part in the campaigns of the late sixties and had suffered from the ensuing massive repression had lost confidence in the future and in the regime's policies. Young workers, for example, asked: "The waves of class struggle have struck one after the other, but when will Communism be realized?"⁵⁸ Students in an agricultural college in Hunan went even further:

Having been engaged in criticism and struggle for more than twenty years, we see only...a repetition of a cycle in which one unrepentant [revisionist] crumbles and another rises to a top position. We are convinced that lifelong struggle will not assure the success of the Socialist Revolution.⁵⁹

In the course of the seventies, the successive persecutions, the unfeasible economic and educational policies of the Maoists and the manipulative tactics used by all of the Party's leaders alienated an increasing number of young Chinese.⁶⁰ In the autumn of 1974, a wave of protests and marches organized by demobilized soldiers, young workers and rusticated youths occurred in Guangzhou. The participants demanded an improvement in their miserable living conditions and redress regarding the unjustified treatment they had suffered. The activities of the Li Yizhe group were part of these more general popular protests and contributed to the expansion of street actions in the city.⁶¹

During the Chongyang Festival (the ninth day of the ninth month according to the lunar calendar) on 23 October 1974, a spontaneous outburst of discontent occurred at Baiyunshan (White Cloud Mountain). Several thousands of young people were the backbone of this event. The "Double Ninth" is a traditional day for commemorating the dead. In south China, this event is almost as important as the Qingming Festival, which served as the rallying point for the April Fifth Movement in 1976. At the Chongyang Festival, young southern Chinese traditionally climb mountains with friends and fly paper kites in order to attract a good fortune the following year.

In October 1974, the excursions to White Cloud Mountain were used to express discontent with current social developments. Many young people, protected by the mass, dared to air their grievances. Some declared "We're fed up with what's going on in Canton.... We have been waiting for the fruits of the Cultural Revolution to ripen, but all we have gathered is a sour harvest. We're fed up with campaigns and with the privileges of the

cadres." The crowd shouted slogans like: "Down with the fancy villas and fishponds!" built for the elite (residences of top cadres are located at White Cloud Mountain.) The crowd wrote slogans on their kites like: "Better 50 years in Hong Kong than 100 years here in Guangzhou." When security forces arrived in trucks to disperse the crowd, the demonstrators left the scene voluntarily.

This event was a very short-lived affair leaving no dissident writings or wall posters behind. But it was a significant antecedent to the 1976 Qingming incidents in which young people again assumed the leading role. Youth protest was a widespread phenomenon in the seventies. Former red guards were the backbone of many political incidents.

Dissent: Red Guard Radicalism Comes of Age

More articulate voices of dissent could be heard from time to time during the seventies. Sources on dissent in the years between 1972 and 1975 are relatively scarce. But with the help of regional, internal and recently published material it is possible to document a thin stream of dissident activity during this period. The action taken by dissidents manifested itself in very different ways: slogans painted on walls, detailed wall posters, speeches held during work unit sessions, anonymous or signed letters and petitions to the Party center as well as mimeographed broadsheets on diverse political topics. The authors do not necessarily represent the beliefs and opinions of the populace at large. But at least some sections of what they wrote and said give us clues as to what was going on in Chinese urban society in this period.

A large proportion of dissidents emerged from so-called study groups (*dushuhui*, *yanjiu xiaozu*, etc.). During their time in the countryside and after returning to the cities, many former red guards met on a regular basis to exchange opinions on a wide range of topics. Those networks assumed an important role in the dissident activities of the seventies. In a similar way, theory groups (*lilunzu*) established in the context of Party-led campaigns could serve as an umbrella camouflaging the discussion of unconventional or even deviant ideas.

Such circles, both those established unofficially and those set up with official approval, can be seen as incipient forms of the urban salons (*shalong*) of the late seventies and eighties. Friendship circles of demobilized red

guards and young workers who had met each other during the late sixties or during their time in the countryside were at the heart of many political activities. Bonnin and Chevrier talk about a "cellular level of social autonomy" in this context. In many local protest movements as well as in the 1976 April Fifth Movement and in the 1978/79 Democracy Wall movement, these circles played an important role as core groups at the center of political activism.⁶²

In the course of the seventies, dissidents with a rebel background (belonging to radical mass organizations in the late sixties) and those with a "conservative" background (belonging to mass associations which tried to protect the Party establishment) converged on several principal issues: they criticized the political manipulation and witch-hunts accompanying the system of mass mobilization and they turned against leading protagonists of the radicals in Beijing and the provinces. Therefore, the writings of former radicals like the Li Yizhe group (Guangzhou) or Li Dongmin group (Beijing), in certain important points, reveal surprising similarities with those of erstwhile "conservatives" like the dissident Xu Shuiliang in Nanjing and the Guiyang group.

Dissidents with a Radical Factional Background

An important early critical voice that hinted at the direction opposition could take in the seventies was the manifesto "Whither China?" drawn up by Yang Xiguang, who was affiliated to a radical rebel organization in Changsha (Hunan province) in 1968. The author severely attacked basic elements of the communist regime such as the system of privileges or the PLA's role as a repressive instrument and came to the conclusion that a "red capitalist class" had established itself at the top of the power hierarchy. The document was condemned by the central leadership in Beijing, which at the same time distributed it as "material to be criticized." Thus, the ideas contained in the manifesto gained broader publicity. Similar essays written mostly by members of radical red guard factions were unofficially distributed in other provinces and cities in the late sixties.⁶³

Though this sort of dissident activism was almost completely suppressed in the following years (1968-72), it continued to exert a strong influence on young Chinese. Many former red guards lost interest in factional struggles and began to question the official class struggle ideology which presented the Communist Party as the element leading the proletariat. They came to

see the basic conflict in China as one between a privileged, manipulative class of Party cadres on the one hand and a powerless mass of ordinary people on the other.⁶⁴

The Guangzhou Li Yizhe group presented such ideas in a comprehensive analysis of what they called the "Lin Biao system." In November 1974, Li Yizhe formulated a fundamental criticism of hypocritical "empty politics," the personality cult, corruption, privileges and arbitrary power. The group's essay "On Socialist Democracy and the Chinese Legal System" was backed by individual high-level cadres in Guangdong for some time and was circulated in several provinces.⁶⁵ The Li Yizhe document probably was the second most influential *samizdat* in the China of the seventies, ranking only behind the unofficial collections of the Tiananmen poems that were circulated from 1976 to 1978.

Many parts of the Li Yizhe document went far beyond what ordinary Chinese dared to say or even think at that time. Li Yizhe pointed to problems nobody could overlook, and many of the basic ideas were re-articulated again and again by dissident forces throughout the seventies. In 1975, an internal report on university journals (*xuebao*) which had been prepared by the Ministry of Education complained that some of the publications debated the emergence of a "new bourgeois privileged stratum" (*xin zichanjieji tequan jiecheng*) in China.⁶⁶ Similarly, several poems and manifestos made public during the 1976 Tiananmen Incident demanded that the Chinese people "must never tolerate the re-emergence of feudal princes and marquises in China."⁶⁷ One can see obvious similarities here with what Li Yizhe had written in 1974 and with the popular resentment towards the system of patronage and privileges.

A long manifesto not as well known as the Li Yizhe writings but equally significant was written by a young author named Chen Erjin from Yunnan in the mid-seventies: "On the Democratic Revolution of the Proletariat." Chen had belonged to a rebel red guard faction in Kunming in the late sixties. In his essay, he strictly referred to a Marxist argumentation and came to radical conclusions. He stated that the structure of the Chinese economic system mainly served the interests of the "privileged class." The workers were subject to "slave labor," a new polarization between those who rule and those being ruled was in the making. Freedom of speech or the press were merely empty words, propaganda was full of lies and politics full of terror. Chen Erjin claimed that the political character of the Communist

Party had changed and that he had detected “cancerous cells (*aixibao*) of a revisionist-fascist Party.”⁶⁸

Another interesting example is a dissident group formed in Beijing around the former leader of a “moderate” local rebel faction. Li Dongmin, who had become a member of the Beijing Municipal Revolutionary Committee in 1967 but had been denounced as a “May Sixteenth” element in the early seventies, protested against the exclusion of erstwhile Cultural Revolution activists from official bodies in Beijing. He demanded a fair treatment of former rebels and denounced the repressive tactics used against wall poster writers by the municipal leadership around mayor Wu De.⁶⁹

Dissidents with a radical factional background like Chen Erjin and the members of the Li Yizhe and Li Dongmin groups kept alive and refined the emancipatory current inherent in the rebel ideology of the late sixties: they pulled away from the narrow and politically partial activism of their earlier years and started to raise questions about the repressive and manipulative character of the Chinese communist system itself.

Dissidents with a “Conservative” Background

It is less surprising that those active in “conservative” factional groupings in the late sixties continued to oppose the goals, methods and instigators of the Cultural Revolution in the seventies. The *clientèle* of the veteran cadres had a strong interest in ending Cultural Revolution-style class struggle campaigns of which they were likely to become the victims. On the other hand, it is significant that many of the former activists from the “conservative” side went beyond mere support for the veteran cadres and opposition to the radical left. Many of them also started to doubt elements of the Party state like the system of privileges or the lack of political responsiveness to popular needs.

“Conservative” oppositional voices had occasionally been heard even in the early seventies. At the end of 1972, a worker from Henan province, Peng Cheng from Kaifeng, had sent a lengthy memorandum to the Party center in which he sharply denounced those among the Party leaders who agitated for continuous class struggle: they had lost their sense of political responsibility.⁷⁰

Similarly, in March 1973, a Party member from Chengdu, Tu Deyong, formulated “Ten Accusations against the Cultural Revolution” in which he

outlined the bad impact social chaos, violence and political persecution was having on society. He observed an “unprecedented decline in morality in society” (*shehui daode kongqian duoluo*) as well as in the prestige of the Communist Party. He even stated that the Chinese people nostalgically longed for a return to the principles of rule which had been applied in the fifties.⁷¹

In the mid-seventies, about the same time as the Li Yizhe group became active, twelve members of a remnant “conservative” factional grouping from Taiyuan (Shanxi province) denounced the “ultra-leftist line” of Lin Biao and the “Trotskyist careerists” Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyan. In particular, they blamed the excessive class struggle campaigns for the decline of the Chinese economy, the deterioration of people’s livelihoods and the degeneration of cultural life and educational standards.⁷²

More comprehensive demands were raised by a young worker in Nanjing. The courageous individual protests put forward by Xu Shuiliang (a former Hangzhou red guard leader who had been sent away from his home province to work in Nanjing) are significant documents for the dissident potential among former activists of the Cultural Revolution.⁷³ In his Nanjing wall posters, Xu Shuiliang turned against the “system of privileges,” “rightist reformism” and “leftist blind activism” and demanded the Chinese leadership to give the people rights of political control and participation. In 1975, Xu Shuiliang denounced Wang Hongwen and Yao Wenyan and also criticized the “backdoor” practices employed by veteran cadres. After his arrest in September 1975, he wrote letters to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai warning that the popular mood might turn against Mao.⁷⁴ Similar cases of individual activism occurred in other places.⁷⁵

A further important example of the political activism of erstwhile “conservative” red guards is a spectacular action in Guiyang in March 1976, when a group of seven workers publicly displayed an eighty-page wall poster entitled “Some thoughts on the present situation and on the new historical tasks” dealing with problems of the Party’s economic and educational policies. This group had its roots in a private association formed by rusticated youths in the early seventies. Since the late sixties and during their time in the countryside, they had come to see their earlier radicalism as a form of “blind foolhardiness” and wanted to advocate a reorientation towards more rational policies.⁷⁶

Dissidents with a "Bad Class" Background

Interestingly, several young members of the "black categories" (*heiwulei*) can also be found among the dissidents of the seventies. They lived a life as political outsiders who had already been stigmatized prior to the Cultural Revolution and had usually not been allowed to join red guard organizations in the late sixties.

A dissident group in Wan county (Sichuan province) was led by an activist whose father had been labeled a "capitalist" because of his past as a wealthy banker. The son, named Mu Qizhong, was very unhappy with the discrimination his family suffered. When the persecutions escalated during the Cultural Revolution, he founded a "study group" with some friends. They wrote an essay with the title "Where Is China Going?" and criticized the Cultural Revolution as "feudalist fascism."⁷⁷

The Beijing wall posters written under the pseudonym "Golden Monkey" (*Jin Hou*) in the summer of 1974, are another interesting example of the originality of the politically stigmatized in Chinese society of the seventies. Chen Jiahou, the author of a series of wall posters, suffered from the fact that some of his relatives had been bank owners and landlords prior to the Communist takeover. He responded to this stigmatization with harsh cynicism, declaring that "the only right bestowed on the masses of the people is to work hard.... In the past the capitalists used a leather whip plus hunger to force the factory workers to sell themselves to them; today Socialism uses a different method but achieves the same result." Moreover, Chen blamed the repressive campaigns of the early seventies for "causing many innocent people to suffer hardships, difficulties and persecution." He also fundamentally criticized the arbitrary arrest of "political prisoners" (*zhengzhifan*), a term which is largely excluded from the official vocabulary.⁷⁸

One of the most prominent dissidents from a "bad class" background is Hu Ping (now exiled), whose father was executed as a "counter-revolutionary." Hu was prevented from taking part in the red guard movement and started to think and write about the injustice inflicted by the Communist regime on the Chinese people. His essay "On Freedom of Speech," which circulated among his close friends in the mid-seventies, criticized basic elements of the Communist regime. Hu pointed out that during the Cultural Revolution, freedom of speech had been suppressed to such an extent that people were not able to communicate with each other in a humane way.

Hence, people no longer knew what was really going on and, because of that, had been inescapably drawn into the political manipulations of that time. According to Hu Ping, breaking through this communicational blockade was the most important initial step to winning political freedom.⁷⁹

Underground Manifestos and Clandestine Literature

Quite a number of written political statements circulated "underground" among friends and relatives in the mid-seventies. Most of those texts were made known to a wider public only after 1979 when they were published in unofficial journals or in Hong Kong magazines. Chen Erjin's and Hu Ping's essays belong to this category.

In addition to underground political manifestos, limited forms of an unofficial counter-culture can be seen in several examples of clandestine literature that circulated in China in the seventies. Young Chinese were particularly eager to get hold of something "interesting" to read and were willing to take great risks for this. Manuscripts were usually copied by hand, only in rare cases mimeographed. Controls seem to have been tight in the cities but much less strict in certain rural areas where the poetry and study circles set up by rusticated youths were enthusiastic readers of clandestine "black" books.

Many of the underground authors were former red guards, among them members of "conservative" organizations like the United Action Committee (*Liangong*) and radical organizations like the Hunan Proletarian Alliance Committee (*Shengwulian*). These young Chinese tried to come to terms with their past by wrapping their political experiences in a literary form.⁸⁰

Some of the most popular underground works were very critical of the social situation and of the consequences of radical policies. Several authors fundamentally questioned the meaning of class struggle and political campaigns by asking whether human beings were "born only to hate and suffer."⁸¹ Some underground literature indirectly denounced abuses of power by Party cadres and army officers. The "hypocrisy" (*dao mao anran*) of official rhetoric and propaganda was ridiculed in a number of these works but the Communist Party was almost never openly attacked as an institution. In a literary diary that went from hand to hand in southern China, the devastating impact of the Cultural Revolution and its aftermath was expressed in a very pronounced manner. It said: "At the moment, there are many madmen. All of them are madmen with a lot of reason. Because if

you are not mad life isn't much fun anymore. There are only few men whose soul is still in balance.... The last seven years [1966-72] were a time for madmen."⁸²

The April Fifth Movement

Spectacular acts of open dissent and opposition were the exception during the early and mid-seventies. Only individual and extremely courageous activists dared to raise their political doubts and beliefs in public. Against this background, the meaning and significance of the 1976 April Fifth Movement lies in the very fact that a mass movement erupted from the grass-roots, at a time when this seemed almost unthinkable. During the 1976 Qingming demonstrations, many usually silent and passive Chinese expressed their feelings, sorrows, and discontent. The people went to the demonstrations knowing that they were doing something prohibited, perhaps even dangerous. Under cover of the huge crowd, they displayed an upright attitude, straight words and spontaneous emotions which most of them had never thought of expressing before.

The demonstrations triggered by the mourning for Zhou Enlai became an emotional eruption and an outcry against the suppression and injustice inflicted on the people by the instigators of the Cultural Revolution. In fact, it was a rebellion against the goals, methods and consequences of the Cultural Revolution itself.⁸³

Many urban Chinese regarded the time around Zhou's death in January 1976 as a crucial period for China's future. The question of leadership succession had become a fateful issue in their minds. They felt threatened by the Maoists' attempts to re-radicalize the political system and to defame Zhou's political legacy, which was encapsulated in the formula of the "Four Modernizations." Under these very special circumstances, the April Fifth Movement became a powerful but short-lived counter-mobilization against the radicals. It revealed how strong the opposition against the radicals, their policies and their ambitions in the succession struggle was among ordinary Chinese.

A New Political Vision

Some of the Tiananmen poems frankly denounced the atrocities of the Cultural Revolution and put the entire blame for the political distress on the

radicals. Some speakers on Tiananmen Square mentioned "demonic forces" that "stubbornly allege that production could be promoted by 'campaigns'." With respect to the poor condition of the economy, this was denounced as a fatal error: "If this continues, our country will perish, and Communism cannot be realized." Instead of mass campaigns and endless political splittings, the time should be ripe for "great unity."⁸⁴

The enthusiasm expressed for the concept of the "Four Modernizations" on Tiananmen Square is conspicuous. About 150 writings explicitly supported the "Great Plan" of economic modernization ascribed to Zhou Enlai. The authors called for a struggle to "build a strong, modernized country." "The Four Modernizations...represent the interest and the longing of the whole people.... We don't want all those other nice slogans any more!" Those who were opposed to strengthening the economy had to be blamed if China remained in her dire straits for ever. Only by concentrating on production could the living standards of the population be raised: "The troublemaking and the sabotage of those people are the reason why the economy is stagnating. The peasants do not have enough to eat, and the workers' lives are getting harder and harder."⁸⁵ Besides the widespread supply problems, working conditions in factories and offices were blamed for the situation of the country. Discontent with the regime's wage policies was aired in Nanjing but does not seem to have been very prominent in most other places.⁸⁶

The "Four Modernizations" were understood as "Zhou's legacy" and became part of an emerging Zhou cult: "The day the Four Modernizations are realized, we will make sacrifices and pay homage to you again." There were even calls to overthrow all those who refused to put Zhou's program into practice.⁸⁷ During the 1976 Qingming movement, the "Four Modernizations" were elevated to a vision of the future that sharply contrasted with the political struggles and economic stagnation experienced during the hardships of the Cultural Revolution and the recurrent mass campaigns.

Distrust of Mao

Mao's mystique as an infallible helmsman had suffered after the excesses of the Cultural Revolution. The Lin Biao affair of 1971, when an attempt to topple the sacrosanct Chairman was attributed to Mao's chosen successor, constituted an additional strong blow to Mao's prestige.⁸⁸ At the beginning of 1976, many people took it amiss that Mao dropped the late Premier

Zhou Enlai and exposed Zhou's legacy to the criticism of the radicals. Many Chinese felt betrayed and were not willing to accept this anymore. On Tiananmen Square, Zhou was praised as the "Father of the Nation" (*guofu*) whose name would be recorded in the "annals of history" at the highest (!) place.⁸⁹

Compared with Zhou Enlai, the Chairman was praised only rarely on the square. By the standards of that time, this alone constituted an affront to Mao. The homage paid to Zhou indicated a turning away from the cult surrounding Mao. Photographs of the late prime minister were pasted onto maps of China and on red stars. Up until that point, this honor had mostly been reserved for Mao. In addition, numerous large portraits of Zhou were set up in a row, exactly opposite the huge picture of Mao above the entrance to the Forbidden City. This pictorial confrontation of the two Communist leaders had obvious symbolic significance.⁹⁰

The only open, unequivocal criticism of Mao on Tiananmen Square was voiced in a lengthy poem containing the spectacular line "Gone for good is Qin Shihuang's feudal society."⁹¹ This sentence was read and copied again and again on the square. The first emperor of the Qin dynasty, who is notorious for his repressive rule, had repeatedly served as a code name alluding to Mao. Since the fifties, Mao himself had compared the Chinese Communist regime with the reign of Qin Shihuang in its determined suppression of dissidents: "We have surpassed Qin Shihuang a hundred-fold." In the seventies, before and during the "Campaign Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius," Qin Shihuang was praised for having followed "progressive" ways by means of "revolutionary violence." As a consequence, every statement on Qin Shihuang tended to be understood as a statement on Chairman Mao in the seventies.⁹²

A number of politically-minded Chinese like the anonymous author of the Tiananmen poem were critical of praising the notorious tyrant of Chinese history. In autumn 1974, a daredevil attack had been launched by a 26 year old worker named Shi Yunfeng in Changchun. In several pamphlets and wall slogans he demanded a return to the political principles of the 1956 Party Congress and a departure from the path taken since the Cultural Revolution, which had harmed "our Party and our nation." He demanded an end to the policies of the Cultural Revolution which he blamed for the omnipresent political repression. Shi called for the fabricated charges against Liu Shaoqi and other veteran cadres to be dropped. His most

daredevil slogan, however, was: "Oppose the personality cult! The Communist Party does not need a 'Party Emperor' (*Dang huangdi*)!" For this and for other statements, Shi Yunfeng was publicly executed in December 1976. His open criticism had broken the taboo surrounding the sacrosanct Chairman Mao.⁹³

Shi Yunfeng was not the only one who dared to compare Mao with a feudal emperor, prior to the Tiananmen incident. According to Taiwanese intelligence information, a young man had been executed for the same reason in Guangzhou as early as December 1973.⁹⁴ He had drawn a caricature depicting the tyrant Qin Shihuang submissively kneeling in front of Mao, who was sitting on a throne, to pay his deference to him. This was obviously a cynical allusion to Mao's pride in having surpassed the repressive rule of Qin Shihuang.

Incipient Criticism of the Regime

Beyond this dissociation from Mao, the April Fifth Movement was carried forward by many of those complaints mentioned in earlier dissident manifestos: a lack of responsiveness to the people's needs and wishes, political arbitrariness and abuses by the authorities, disrespect for socialist ideals proclaimed by the leaders themselves, and serious economic problems.

During the April Fifth Movement, more comprehensive criticism of the regime was also occasionally articulated. There are a few significant documents that have not been much quoted in Chinese and Western works dealing with that event. They can only be found in *samizdat* collections of Tiananmen poems, writings and speeches distributed before the official reassessment of the movement. Several of these writings resembled the criticism formulated by the Li Yizhe group and other dissidents in the first half of the seventies. But only a small proportion of the Tiananmen demonstrators had probably ever heard of their writings.⁹⁵

A young worker attacked the official media, then largely controlled by the radicals, in his "memorandum" for repeating "hackneyed Communist phrases" that "cannot satisfy the hopes of the people."⁹⁶ Another one denounced people who believed that human beings could "be full without eating by mouthing high-sounding words when feeling hungry."⁹⁷ One of those speaking to the crowd called for a return to the "old revolutionary tradition" with "leaders who can truly represent the interests of the people and who serve the people.... Let the people themselves choose...these

leaders!”⁹⁸ A satirical writing appeared on the square on 5 April but, even after the rehabilitation, it was only rarely mentioned because of its political sensitivity. It belongs to the most significant examples of an incipient criticism of the Communist regime aiming at the autocracy of the Party and especially at the radicals:

Look how “wise” I am. I celebrate Marx and praise Lenin. Everybody has to read my papers. Everybody must listen to my broadcasts. I determine where the West is, determine where the East is. If I ask you to move, you will move. If I ask you to stop, you will stop. If you workers and peasants are not willing to obey, I will issue a great order from the Center and give a notice to my lackeys: whoever is opposed to it is a counter-revolutionary.⁹⁹

In those mocking lines, one of the topics of the Cultural Revolution was brought up again: that the Party treated the people like children or even servants. In the late fifties and early sixties, Liu Shaoqi and the official press had called on Party members and the young people to become “docile tools” (*shunfu gongju*): “Where the Party tells us to go, there we will go; what the Party wants us to do, that we will do.”¹⁰⁰ The concept “docile tools” began to epitomize the tyranny by the Party bureaucrats, and the red guards heavily attacked this kind of treatment during the Cultural Revolution. The Tiananmen poem took up this topic again, in very similar words.

A comprehensive content analysis of 1,291 transcriptions of Tiananmen poems, slogans, speeches, etc.¹⁰¹ reveals that not a single writing from Tiananmen Square openly questioned the leading role of the Communist Party. A change of the political line or an improvement in the work style (*zuofeng*) of the Party were the limited wishes at the center of the April Fifth Movement. Only a tiny minority among the activists strove for an expansion of political freedom and rights. This minority aired its demands again during the Democracy Wall movement of 1978–79, but could never rely on a mass social basis.

Conclusion: Demobilization and Counter-Cultural Revolution

The Cultural Revolution and the repressive campaigns in its wake had undone a normal, peaceful life within society and even within families. By the recurrent calls for struggling “class enemies,” people found themselves stifled in their social life and repressed in their communication with other

Chinese.¹⁰² Many social relations had broken up in an environment of denunciation. The assessment made by a “rightist” in 1957 applied even more to the seventies: “Since 1952, campaign has succeeded campaign, each one leaving a great wall in its wake, a wall which estranges one man from another.” A participant in the Tiananmen demonstrations characterized the social atmosphere prevailing in the seventies with the simple words: “You felt lonely even in a crowd.”¹⁰³

People had had enough of mass campaigns. Some Chinese interviewees estimate that in the mid-seventies only about ten percent of the urban populace was still willing to actively participate in political campaigns. The large majority had come to deeply resent the politics of mass mobilization and any kind of political manipulation. The people were fed up with empty rhetoric, endless factional struggles, and arbitrary exposures and detentions. Many people drew the consequences from the devastating experiences of the late sixties. They did not want to become involved in large-scale political clashes any more. Their slogan for survival was: “If the thunder of cannons comes from both sides, left and right, try to cower in the middle” (*liangbian dapao, zhongjian wodao*).¹⁰⁴

It captures the political climate of that period well. Violent factional clashes were carried out by a minority of hostile groupings. Most Chinese tried to keep out of the way. Many workers, for instance, simply avoided turning up at their workplace if they expected that factional clashes might occur.¹⁰⁵ For most Chinese, participation in political campaigns became reduced to a ritualized activity like “eating and drinking,” as one interviewee put it. One did not care about whether it was Lin Biao, Confucius, or Deng Xiaoping who were the targets of a campaign. It was more important not to become conspicuous by displaying deviant behavior.

There obviously existed a very strong current in Chinese society that ran against the goals, methods and consequences of the Cultural Revolution. This social current occasionally came to the surface in numerous uncoordinated local protests and dissident activities. It was present in the widespread aversion towards new mobilizational campaigns. It found an aggregated intense expression in many places throughout China during the 1976 Qingming demonstrations and was made particularly obvious by the mass movements in Beijing and Nanjing. The Qingming demonstrations in these two places produced incipient forms of cross-factional unity that contributed to the suspension of cleavages that had been pervading Chinese

society since the late sixties. Thus, the 1976 demonstrations indicated the potential for a social life beyond the manipulated struggles of the past.¹⁰⁶

Many people just did not want to be manipulated any more for the contradictory purposes of the different persons and groupings within the political leadership. In exceptional situations, some of the most courageous, acting on their own or in cooperation with like-minded friends, attempted to struggle for a political reorientation that might transcend the conflicts of the Cultural Revolution.

The grass-roots protests of the mid-seventies did not constitute a major threat to the Communist regime, at any time. These were limited revolts, closely bound to the impact and experiences of the Cultural Revolution, and almost exclusively of a reactive and defensive character: The participants defied political despotism but only a few went so far as to demand an expansion of participatory rights.

This also applies to the April Fifth Movement. The basic demand of the demonstrations in spring 1976 was for an end to radical mobilizational policies. But the demonstrators were not out to shake the basis of Communist rule (although, objectively, their spontaneous political activities temporarily undermined the Communist Party's organizational monopoly). They felt that most of their hardships were a result of a "wrong" political line and a bad Party "work style" as well as of the manipulations by the radicals in the Party leadership. Many believed that a return to the times of "clean government" as experienced in the early fifties would be sufficient. Compared with the Cultural Revolution, that period appeared to them like a golden age.

We can recognize a restorative tendency here prevailing in large sections of Chinese society as well as in the Communist Party at the time.¹⁰⁷ Backward-looking moods had gained much ground among the population in the early seventies. The hopes of many ordinary Chinese were directed towards a restoration of the pre-Cultural Revolution regime much more than towards a fundamentally new political orientation. These popular notions fitted the goals of the veteran cadres in the succession struggle. In fact, the restorative tendencies among the population became one of the strongest assets for the takeover by the old guard. The majority of the Chinese wanted to see an end to class struggle and improvements in their livelihood. When the post-Mao leadership promised to put such a program into practice most

Chinese were appeased; generally speaking, people stopped thinking about the necessity of more thorough-going political reforms.

Only a small minority of activists articulated incipient criticism of the principles and methods of Party dictatorship. For them, the 1976 Qingming demonstrations were an attempt "to gain control over a party and a state that had become increasingly alien to them." The suppression of the demonstrations was understood by them as a "public confirmation of the estrangement of the Party from the people."¹⁰⁸

Several of these activists (who, significantly, did not enjoy mass support) continued their efforts and intensified their political demands until they became publicly active again during the Democracy Wall Movement in the winter of 1978-79. People like Wei Jingsheng or Wang Xizhe were the ones who tried to keep alive the emancipatory current derived from the agenda and the experiences of the red guard generation. At the same time, the activities of dozens of autonomous mini-organizations and editorial committees brought the Counter-Cultural Revolution of the seventies to a conclusion and initiated a new stage in the criticism of Communist rule.¹⁰⁹ Demands that went far beyond a mere opposition to the policies of the Cultural Revolution moved to the center of all major political protests staged after 1979.

Notes:

¹ See Marie-Claire Bergère, "China's Urban Society After Mao," in Jürgen Domes (ed.), *Chinese Politics After Mao* (Cardiff: University College, 1979), pp. 155-73, esp. p. 157, and her book *La République populaire de Chine, de 1949 à nos jours* (Paris: Armand Collin, 1987), pp. 151-55.

² For studies of persisting factional tensions in the provinces during the seventies, see Keith Forster, *Rebellion and Factionalism in a Chinese Province: Zhejiang, 1966-76* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1990), pp. 3-246; Wang Shaoguang, *Lixing yu fengkuang: Wenhua da geming zhong de qunzhong (Reason and Insanity: The Masses during the Great Cultural Revolution)* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 247-88; Sebastian Heilmann, *Sozialer Protest in der VR China: Die Bewegung vom 5. April 1976 und die Gegen-Kulturrevolution der siebziger Jahre (Grass-Roots Protest in the PRC: The 1976 April Fifth Movement and the Counter-Cultural Revolution of the Seventies)* (Hamburg: Institut für Asienkunde, 1994).

³ Interviews held in Nanjing, Beijing and Kaifeng, 1987-91.

⁴ Cf. Andrew J. Nathan, "Chinese Democracy: The Lessons of Failure," *The Journal of Contemporary China*, No. 4 (Fall 1993), pp. 3-13, esp. p. 5.

⁵ See Anita Chan, Stanley Rosen and Jonathan Unger (eds.), *On Socialist Democracy and the Chinese Legal System: The Li Yizhe Debates* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1985).

⁶ For a similar argument, cf. Bergère, *La République populaire*, p. 155.

⁷ A formulation used by Liu Binyan, cited after Anita Chan, "Dispelling Misconceptions About the Red Guard Movement: The Necessity to Re-examine Cultural Revolution Factionalism and Periodization," *The Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (September 1992), pp. 61-85.

⁸ See Sebastian Heilmann, *Nanking 1976. Spontane Massenbewegungen im Gefolge der Kulturrevolution (Spontaneous Mass Movements in the Wake of the Cultural Revolution)* (Bochum: Brockmeyer, 1990).

⁹ Conducting interviews with Chinese eye-witnesses on events surrounding the Cultural Revolution and especially on popular political activism is an interesting experience. The post-Mao Party leadership has poured the authoritative historical assessment of that period, which exclusively serves the interests of the veteran cadres, over the heads of the Chinese in large doses in the last two decades. That propaganda effort became a big success: many individual memories seem to have drowned in official interpretation of the history of the Cultural Revolution.

¹⁰ See Chen Peihua (Anita Chan), "Dui Wen'ge 'shehui chongtulun' de yijian" ("Opinion on the 'Social Conflict Theory' of the Cultural Revolution"), *Zhengming (Contention)*, Hong Kong, No.10 (Oct. 1990), pp. 59-62; Anita Chan, "Dispelling Misconceptions," *passim*.

¹¹ In some regions like Sichuan this period actually lasted till the end of 1969. See *Dangdai Sichuan de gongren jieji he gonghui yundong (The Working Class and the Trade Union Movement in Contemporary Sichuan)* (Chengdu, Sichuan People's Press: 99), p. 32.

¹² See for example CCP Central Committee Documents Research Office (ed.), *Guanyu jianguo yilai Dang de ruogan lishi wenti de jueyi zhushiben (Annotated Edition of the Resolution on Certain Questions in the Party's History since the Founding of the PRC)* (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1986), p. 422. For the ubiquitous denunciation of "factionalism" in the mid-seventies, see *China News Analysis*, Hong Kong, Nos. 1012 and 1013 (5 and 12 September 1975), *passim*.

¹³ See Forster, *Rebellion and Factionalism*, pp. 131-76; Wang Shaoguang, *Lixing yu fengkuang*, pp. 247-63; Cheng Chao and Wei Haoben (eds.), *Zhejiang "wen'ge" jishi (A Chronicle of the Cultural Revolution in Zhejiang)* (Hengzhou: Zhejiang fangzhi bianjibu, 1989), pp.192-261.

¹⁴ For the scattered sources on violent regional struggles, see Heilmann, *Sozialer Protest*, pp. 22-25.

¹⁵ Xu Shiyou passed this verdict during a Nanjing meeting with provincial "mass representatives" in the early seventies. Interviews with a military cadre who had participated in those meetings, 1987 and 1988.

¹⁶ For the rebel forces' activities in Henan province, see *Zhengzhou tieluju dangwei fushuji Li Keji tongzhi zai "quanguo gongye xue Daqing" huiyi shang de fayan (Speech given by the deputy secretary of the Zhengzhou Railway Bureau Party committee during the "Chinese Industry Learn from Daqing" Conference)*, material distributed by the secretariat of the conference, 25 April 1977, pp. 1-16. *Henan Ribao (Henan Daily)*, Zhengzhou, 4 June 1978; 7 and 22 February 1979.

¹⁷ See also Keith Forster, "Spontaneous and Institutional Rebellion in the Cultural Revolution: The Extraordinary Case of Weng Senhe," *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, No. 27 (Jan.1992), pp. 39-75.

¹⁸ The repressive campaigns of the early seventies are described in detail by Barbara Barnouin and Yu Changgen, *Ten Years of Turbulence: The Chinese Cultural Revolution* (London: Kegan Paul International, 1993), pp. 178-98.

¹⁹ The leadership positions in those organizations were usually distributed according to the principle of factional parity (*duideng yuanze*): representatives from "conservative" as well as "radical" local factions were incorporated in the re-established mass organizations. The "conservative" members could rely on the indirect or direct support of the veteran cadres in the provincial Party establishment. Their opponents became particularly active in 1974 and 1976 when the temporary political re-radicalization confined the "conservatives" to a defensive position. See *Dangdai Sichuan de gongren jieji*, pp. 139-43; Wang Shaoguang, *Lixing yu fengkuang*, pp. 253-54 and 277. In Yunnan the provincial Youth League apparently even attempted to revitalize the rebel red guard movement. See Yunnan Provincial Service, 7 June 1976 (British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), *Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB)*, *The Far East*, FE/5258 (3 July 1976), BI/2).

²⁰ This term was coined by Peter R. Moody, *Opposition and Dissent in Contemporary China* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1977), pp. 186-88.

²¹ The clientelism of rebel leaders in the mid-seventies took similar forms all over China: granting fellow rebels political rehabilitation, Party membership and promotion to cadre positions. It reached particularly big proportions in Henan province. Tang Qishan, one of the most powerful provincial rebel leaders in the seventies, managed to promote about 1,500 former members of his rebel faction to Party membership or cadre positions in the Zhengzhou Railway Bureau, whose personnel numbered approximately one hundred thousand people. In the entire province, 180,000 new members were admitted to the Communist Party, mostly Cultural Revolution activists. Some 66,000 of them were promoted to cadre status. See *Zhengzhou tieluju dangwei fushuji de fayan*, *passim*; *Henan Ribao*, Zhengzhou, 4 June 1978; 7 and 22 February 1979.

²² Wang Shaoguang, *Lixing yu fengkuang*, pp. 249-84, presents interesting data on factional organizations in Wuhan in the mid-seventies. According to Wang, the local rebels could rely on a core of some hundred activists and a following of up to two thousand people who were only loosely associated. It was very difficult for radical leaders to mobilize their old political constituencies, as these had become extremely cautious or were simply tired of the never-ending struggles. Most active in the mid-seventies were those who were convinced that they couldn't get rid of the "rebel label" anyway. They fought for political recognition and for a reversal of verdicts on "May Sixteenth" elements.

²³ Forster, *Rebellion and Factionalism*, p. 190; Forster, "Spontaneous and Institutional Rebellion," pp. 74-75. See also Ann E. Fenwick, *The Gang of Four and the Politics of Opposition: China, 1971-1976* (Stanford University, unpublished dissertation, 1984), pp. 560-61.

24 For reports on provincial radical "underground organizations" in the mid-seventies see *Xinhua Ribao*, Nanjing, 13 August and 22 October 1977; Wang Shaoguang, *Lixing yu fengkuang*, pp. 263 and 266. *Shaanxi Ribao*, Xi'an, 20 August 1977.

25 An official account of the Cultural Revolution in Jiangxi is given in *Dangdai zhongguo de Jiangxi (Contemporary China's Jiangxi Province)* (Beijing: Dangdai zhongguo chubanshe, 1991), Vol. 1, pp. 73-87 and Vol. 2, pp. 459-65. For the referendum and factional struggles in the mid-seventies, see *Huanghe (Yellow River)*, Hong Kong, No. 2 (October 1976), p. 11; Jiangxi Provincial Service, 7 and 9 July 1977 (SWB, FE/ 5563 (15 July 1977), BII/0-2 and FE/5560 (12 July 1977), BII/5-7). Also informative is *Fengcheng xianzhi (Fengcheng County Gazetteer)* (Shanghai: People's Press, 1989), esp. p. 465.

26 For factional struggles in Henan, see *Henan Ribao*, Zhengzhou, 17 January 1977; 4 June 1978, 7 and 22 February 1979; Gongren Ribao, 17 November 1978; *Zhengzhou tieluju dangwei*, passim; For the railway blockades and their economic impact see Chen Xuewei, "Jingji jianshe de tingzhuang, daotui jiqi lishi jiaoxun: ping 'wen'ge nian de jingji jianshe" ("Stagnation and Setbacks in Economic Construction and the Historical Lessons: Assessing Economic Construction during the Years of the 'Cultural Revolution'"), in: *Shinian hou de pingshuo: "wen'ge" shi lunji (An Appraisal Ten Years After: Studies on the History of the Cultural Revolution)* (Beijing: Dangshi ziliao chubanshe, 1987), p. 196; Ma Qibin et al., *Zhongguo gongchandang zhizheng sishi nian, 1949-1989 (The CCP's Forty Years in Power)* (Beijing: Dangshi ziliao chubanshe, 1990), p. 404. Railway blockades belong to the most powerful protest means in China. Throughout their existence, in the Republican era, in the Cultural Revolution and again in 1989, the railways have been an important target of protest activity in China because of their strategic infrastructural importance. A similar phenomenon can be observed in the former Soviet Union's history of mass protests. See Heilmann, *Sozialer Protest*, pp. 127-28.

27 Cf. Yang Xiguang's (Yang Xiaokai's) recollections presented by Jonathan Unger, "Whither China? Yang Xiguang, Red Capitalists, and the Social Turmoil of the Cultural Revolution," *Modern China*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Jan. 1991), pp. 3-37, esp. pp. 18-19.

28 Jiangxi Provincial Service, 26 November 1977, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), *Daily Report: People's Republic of China* (hereinafter cited as *FBIS-CHI*), 2 December 1977, G2-5).

29 *Feiqu xiankuang (The Present Situation in the Communist Areas)*, Taipei, No. 337 (16 September 1972), pp. 13-14; *China News Analysis*, No. 958 (3 May 1974), p. 7. According to Yang Xiguang, numerous oppositional mini-organizations which had already been active prior to and also during the Cultural Revolution were liquidated in the persecutions from 1968 to 1972. See his article "Ping 'Zhongguo wen'ge shi nian shi'" ("Review of 'A Ten Year History of the Chinese Cultural Revolution'"), *Zhengming (Contention)*, Hong Kong, No. 8 (August 1990), pp. 69-75, esp. pp. 73-74. See also Yang Xiguang, "Yiwei duli zhishifenzi dui dalu zhengzhi gaige de kanfa" ("An Assessment of Mainland Political Reforms by an Independent Intellectual"), in Li Shaomin (ed.), *Dalu zhishifenzi lun zhengzhi, shehui, jingji (Mainland Intellectuals on Politics, Society and Economy)* (Taipei: Guiguan tushugongsi, 1988), pp. 10-11 and 20-21.

30 Whereas in provinces like Zhejiang, Hubei or Henan the campaign triggered a wave of factional and grass-roots activity, the tightly controlled metropolitan areas of Beijing and Shanghai remained calm. This and a certain "metropolitan bias" has led many China scholars to overlook the importance of popular activism in this period.

31 Interview with workers in Nanjing, 1987. The ballad is cited in *Feiqing Yuebao (Chinese Communist Affairs Monthly)*, Taipei, No. 9 (Sept. 1976), p. 106. For the economic difficulties experienced by the Chinese labor force in the seventies, see Andrew G. Walder, *Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), esp. pp. 210-16. In the former Soviet Union, labor discontent also mainly manifested itself in "silent strikes" (*tichie zabastovki*), while open protests were rare. See Karl Schlögel, *Der renitente Held: Arbeiterprotest in der Sowjetunion, 1953-1983 (The Restive Hero: Labor Protest in the Soviet Union)* (Hamburg: Junius, 1984), pp. 112-27.

32 An impressive treatment of "economistic" currents among the Chinese labor force is presented by Elizabeth J. Perry and Li Xun, *Working at Cross-Purposes: Shanghai Labor in the Cultural Revolution*, unpublished paper presented at the International Workshop on the Political Causes and Social Consequences of the Cultural Revolution, Stockholm, 14-15 January 1995. Quoted with the authors' permission.

33 For the situation in Sichuan, see Sichuan Provincial Service, 25 March 1972, cited after *China News Analysis*, No. 886 (7 July 1972), p. 5; an interesting correspondent report from Sichuan is presented by Agence France-Presse, Hong Kong, 14 April 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, 19 April 1978, J 1-3). For Hubei see articles in *Zhanwang (Prospect)*, No.37 (16 April 1975), p. 4, and No. 327 (16 Sept. 1975), p. 14; Andrew G. Walder, "Workers, Managers and the State: The Reform Era and the Political Crisis of 1989," *The China Quarterly*, No. 127 (Sept. 1991), pp. 468-70.

34 For workers' responses to the anti-"bourgeois rights" campaign see B. Michael Frolic, *Mao's People: Sixteen Portraits of Life in Revolutionary China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 251-56; Forster, *Rebellion and Factionalism*, pp. 180-182. For discontent about cadres' misconduct see Walder, *Communist Neo-Traditionalism*, pp. 210-11; Walder, "Workers, Managers and the State," p. 468.

35 For labor protest in the mid-seventies see Walder, "Workers, Managers and the State," pp. 468-70; Institute of Mainland China Affairs, "The Characteristic and Impact of the Tien An Men Incident," *Asian Outlook*, Taipei, Vol. 11, No. 5 (May 1976), pp. 35-40, esp. p. 35; *Zhanwang*, No. 327 (16 Sept. 1975), pp. 13-16; *Gongdang wenli yanjiu (Studies in Communism)*, Taipei, No. 4 (Oct. 1975), pp. 89 and 92. For an official report mentioning strikes in Shandong, cf. *Renmin Ribao (People's Daily)*, 20 December 1976.

36 Forster, "Spontaneous and Institutional Rebellion," pp. 74-75; Forster, *Rebellion and Factionalism*, p. 220.

37 Cf. Chen Xuewei, "Jingji jianshe," p. 86; Zhang Tuosheng, "1975 nian de quanmian zhengdun" ("The Comprehensive Rectification of 1975"), in *Shinian hou de pingshuo*, pp. 114-115; Chen Liren et al. (ed.), *Jiangsu sheng dashiji, 1949-1985 (A Chronicle of Important Events in Jiangsu Province)* (Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 1988), pp. 331-33.

38 For the situation in Wuhan, see Frolic, *Mao's People*, pp. 242-56; *Zhanwang*, No.37 (16 April 1975), p. 4 and No. 327 (16 September 1975), pp. 13-16; Walder, "Workers, Managers and the State," pp. 468-469. Wang Shaoguang, *Lixing yu fengkuang*, p. 259, mentions labor discontent only in passing.

39 See Walder, "Workers, Managers and the State," p. 469; *Shaanxi Ribao*, Xi'an, 28 December 1977; Shaanxi People's Broadcasting Station, 20 Feb. and 27 Oct. 1978, in SWB, FE/5760 (10 March 1978), B II/15 and FE/5956 (31 Oct. 1978), B II/17.

40 The Chinese media, for obvious reasons, abstained from differentiating between Cultural Revolution-style factionalist activity and political dissent that went beyond it. The media used to denounce any oppositional activity as "bourgeois factionalism," even if it obviously had nothing to do with factional strife. In 1979, for instance, groups that were active in local Democracy Wall movements were accused of engaging in "bourgeois factional activities" by establishing inofficial political ties (*chuanlian*) and "adopting the methods previously used by the 'Gang of Four'." See the denunciations carried out by Sichuan Provincial Service, 16 Feb. 1979 and Shandong Provincial Service, 18 Feb. 1979, both in *FBIS-CHI*, 28 Feb. 1979, G 1-3 and J, respectively).⁴⁰

41 For a detailed analysis of the political realignment developing among parts of the red guard generation in the seventies, see Sebastian Heilmann, "The Social Context of Mobilization in China: Factions, Work Units, and Activists during the 1976 April Fifth Movement," *China Information*, Leiden, Vol.VIII, No. 3 (Winter 1993-94), pp. 1-19.

42 The spectrum of grass-roots activism was displayed again in winter 1978-79. The Democracy Wall and *samizdat* activities highlighted in the West were only one minor aspect of

a massive upsurge of social protest at that time. In many cities, petitioners collectively seeking redress, economic support or political rehabilitation in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution dominated the scene. See Andrew J. Nathan, *Chinese Democracy* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1986), pp. 26–27.

43 The most comprehensive treatment of these persecutions so far undertaken is Barnouin and Yu Changgen, *Ten Years of Turbulence*, pp. 178–98.

44 The description of these incidents is based on a number of interviews conducted in Nanjing between 1987 and 1991. Widows' protests occurred in several places throughout Jiangsu province. The most serious incident was caused by a group of widows from Binhai (northern Jiangsu) who had come to the provincial capital in spring 1974 and made life difficult for several high-level cadres. Public lamentations by women belong to the traditional repertoire of expressing grievances, see Lucian Pye, *The Dynamics of Chinese Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Oelschläger, Gunn & Hain, 1981), p. 59.

45 In Wuhan, remnant rebel groups tried to push for the release of their imprisoned "comrades in arms," see Wang Shaoguang, *Lixing yu fengkuang*, pp. 252–53. Even in tightly controlled Beijing, wall posters protesting against political repression and demanding the release of imprisoned "counter-revolutionaries" appeared in the summer of 1974. See the transcripts in *Zhanwang*, No. 299 (16 July 1974), pp. 9–14. Partial translations are presented in Göran Leijonhufvud, *Going Against the Tide: On Dissent and Big-Character Posters in China* (London: Curzon Press, 1990), pp. 111–221.

46 See Hu Ping, "Zhongguo de mouzi" ("The Pupils of China"), *Dangdai (Contemporary)*, No. 3 (1989), pp. 7–72; Philip F. Williams, "Some Provincial Precursors of Popular Dissent Movements in Beijing," *China Information*, Leiden, Vol. VI, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 1–9; see also Jiangxi People's Broadcasting Station, 5 December 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, 18 December 1978, G 3–4.

47 See, for instance, Jiangxi Provincial Service, 7 July 1977, in *SWB*, FE/5560 (12 July 1977), BII/7).

48 For the Nanjing demonstrations and the central directives of 29 and 30 April 1974, see Chen Liren et al., *Jiangsu sheng dashiji*, p. 327. Many people in Nanjing still remember these protests vividly.

49 See *Zhonggong nianbao (Yearbook of Chinese Communism)*, 1975, section 2, p. 315. In the case of Shanghai, the 1974 protests by rusticated youths can be seen as an antecedent to the massive youth demonstrations in this city which gained worldwide attention in winter of 1978–79. On these events, see the reports by Agence France-Presse, 15 and 31 Dec. 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, 18 Dec. 1978, G 6–7 and 2 Feb. 1979, G 5, respectively; *Dongxiang (Trends)*, Hong Kong, No. 3 (1979), pp. 22–23).

50 For an eye-witness account see *Zhongguo Shibao (China Times)*, Taipei, 4 May 1976. In an interview held in Kaifeng in 1991, a local cadre confirmed that such clashes had occurred several times in the mid-seventies.

51 See Frolic, *Mao's People*, pp. 195–209; *Zhonggong nianbao*, 1973, section 2, p. 357 and 1974, section 2, pp. 287–91. The hardship of rusticated youths in those regions was publicized only in winter 1978–79, when representatives of unofficial youth associations came from Yunnan to Beijing. See Reuter, 27 Dec. 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, 28 Dec. 1978, J 1).

52 Martin King Whyte, "Urban Life in the People's Republic," in *The Cambridge History of China*, Vol. 15, *Revolutions Within the Chinese Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 719–20 and 724.

53 Interviews with Zhong Zhimin's former classmates in Nanjing, 1987–88. For Zhong Zhimin's confession and the ensuing anti-backdoor campaign, see *Renmin Ribao*, 8 Jan. 1974; *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jiaoyu dashiji, 1949–1982 (A Chronicle of the PRC's Educational System)* (Beijing: Jiaoyu kexue chubanshe, 1983), p. 460; Gao Gao and Yan Jiaqi, *Zhongguo "wen'ge" shinian shi (The Ten Year History of the Chinese Cultural Revolution)* (Hong Kong: Dagong baoshe, 1986), pp. 478–80.

54 The central circular on the termination of the anti-backdoor campaign is reprinted in *Wen'ge yanjiu ziliao* (Beijing: National Defense University, 1988), Vol. 3, p. 123.

55 See the transcripts in *Zhanwang*, No. 299 (16 July 1974), pp. 9–14; *Zhonghua Yuebao (The China Monthly)*, Hong Kong, No. 8 (1974), pp. 31–32. Several of those who had been most active in the 1974 criticism of corruption were eventually imprisoned in 1977 when the time for the veteran cadres' political revenge had come. See Peter Schier, "Menschenrechte und Opposition in der VR China," *China aktuell*, Hamburg, No. 12 (Dec. 1977), pp. 1942–46, esp. p. 943.

56 A more recent product of this is Bei Ling (ed.), *Hongse guizu (The Red Aristocracy)* (Beijing: Hongqi chubanshe, 1993).

57 Whyte, "Urban Life," p. 79.

58 *Renmin Ribao*, 20 August 1975.

59 Wall poster from Leiyang, 21 March 1976. *Feiqing Yuebao*, No. 9 (Sept. 1976), p. 102.

60 Unger, "Whither China?," p. 34.

61 The following section is based on Frolic, *Mao's People*, pp. 257–65; Stanley Rosen, "Guangzhou's Democracy Movement in Cultural Revolution Perspective," *The China Quarterly*, No. 101 (March 1985), pp. 1–31, esp. p. 5; *Zhonggong nianbao*, 1975, section 2, pp. 310 and 315.

62 See Michel Bonnin and Yves Chevrier, "The Intellectual and the State: The Social Dynamics of Intellectual Autonomy During the Post-Mao Era," *The China Quarterly*, No. 127 (Sept. 1991), pp. 569–93, esp. p. 573; Heilmann, "Social Context of Mobilization," pp. 14–16.

63 Unger, "Whither China," passim; Moody, *Opposition and Dissent*, pp. 202–6; Rosen, "Guangzhou Democracy Movement," p. 2.

64 Unger, "Whither China?," pp. 32–33.

65 Chan, Rosen and Unger, *On Socialist Democracy*, passim. For analogies with Lin Ligu'o's "571 Project," see Moody, *Opposition and Dissent*, pp. 218–21.

66 Cf. *Jiaoyu dashiji*, p. 476.

67 Tong Huaizhou (ed.), *Tiananmen geming shiwenxuan (An Anthology of Revolutionary Poems and Writings from Tiananmen)* (Beijing: Samizdat, reprinted in Fuzhou, 1978), Vol. 2, p. 244.

68 For Chen Erjin see Student Association of Hong Kong Chinese University (ed.), *Minzhu Zhonghua: Zhongguo dalu minjian minzhu yundong beibuzhe wenji (Collected Writings of Imprisoned Activists of the Inofficial Democracy Movement on the Chinese Mainland)*, (Hong Kong: Yuandong shiwu pinglunshu, 1982), pp. 83–121; Chen Erjin, translated and introduced by Robin Munro, *China: Cross Roads Socialism* (London: Verso, 1984).

69 Leijonhufvud, *Going Against the Tide*, pp. 123–29 and 135–38; Personal communication with the red guard specialist Yin Hongbiao of Beijing University. In 1977, the Li Dongmin group was denounced as a "counter-revolutionary clique" that used the anniversary of the Tiananmen Incident as a pretext for anti-Party activities. About forty people who had been critical of mayor Wu De were arrested at that time. See Tong Huaizhou group, *Weida de siwu yundong (The Great April Fifth Movement)* (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 1979), p. 240; *Beijing zhi Chun (Beijing Spring)*, No. 3 (17 Feb. 1979), p. 15. Li Dongmin and other victims of this crackdown were eventually rehabilitated in September 1980, cf. Ma Qibin et al., *Gongchandang zhizheng sishi nian*, p. 462.

70 Peng Cheng, a worker, was arrested only in the wake of the 1976 Tiananmen Incident when the persecution of "counter-revolutionaries" was carried out aggressively. See *Chunfeng Huayu ji (Lessons to be Learned)* (Beijing: Qunzhong chubanshe, 1981), Vol. 2, pp.

215–223. For an analysis of the repressive campaign in the wake of the 1976 Tiananmen Incident see Sebastian Heilmann, "The Suppression of the April Fifth Movement and the Persecution of 'Counterrevolutionaries' in 1976," *Issues and Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Jan. 1994), pp. 37–64.

71 Tu Deyong was detained in 1975 and, in the wake of the 1976 Tiananmen Incident, presented to the Sichuan populace as a model "counterrevolutionary." In May 1976, he was sentenced to life imprisonment. He was eventually rehabilitated in December 1978. See *Chunfeng Huayu ji*, Vol. 2, pp. 1–11.

72 The group was condemned as a "counterrevolutionary clique" and its members arrested in spring 1975. In November 1977, only after the coup against the "Gang of Four," three of them were sentenced to death, the others to long prison terms. They were rehabilitated in March 1979 following the reappraisal of the 1976 Tiananmen Incident. See *Renmin Ribao*, 7 March 1979; Peter Schier, "Der Fall Li Yizhe," *China aktuell*, No. 4 (April 1979), pp. 489–502, esp. p. 498; Ma Qibin et al. *Gongchandang zhizheng sishi nian*, p. 440.

73 Xu Shuiliang said about his political awakening and maturation: "From 1967 till 1975, I myself needed seven or eight years to get rid of the shackles of modern superstition." See his reprinted writings in *Minzhu zhonghua*, p. 146.

74 See *Dongxiang*, No. 5 (Feb. 1979), pp. 23–24. Xu was imprisoned in 1975. In 1976, he came in contact with arrested activists involved in the local Qingming demonstrations. After these people had been rehabilitated as "Heroes of April Fifth," some of them demanded the release of Xu Shuiliang, who had articulated political positions similar to theirs. Xu was released in 1979 and immediately got involved in the Democracy Wall movement in Beijing. For this, he was deported to a labor reform camp and was released only in 1992. According to the *South China Morning Post*, 28 May 1995, Xu got involved in dissident activity in Nanjing again and was re-imprisoned in spring 1995. In an interview held in Nanjing in 1988, a Party cadre contemptfully remembered Xu as "that clown who claimed he wanted to 'help Deng Xiaoping.'" Xu obviously was a thorn in the flesh of the Party establishment, as it was eager to get rid of him.

75 In 1974, a young intellectual displayed a wall poster in Wuhan entitled "Reforming the National System." Apparently, this was so theoretically detached that it did not trigger any significant response. *Huanghe*, No. 2 (October 1976), p. 9.

76 Yu Xiguang (ed.), "*Wenhua da geming*" shangshu ji (A Collection of Written Statements Submitted to the Authorities During the Cultural Revolution) (Changsha: Hunan renmin chubanshe, 1989), pp. 441–500, esp. p. 491. See also the analysis of the group's activities in Heilmann, "Social Context of Mobilization," pp. 14–15.

77 Two of the leading members of this group were sentenced to death in 1975. But the execution of the sentence was put on hold until they were finally released in 1979. In the meantime, Mu Qizhong has become an extremely successful entrepreneur. See *The New York Times*, 30 August 1992. An underground association formed by people with a "bad class" stigma has operated under the name "Society of Concord" (*tongxinhui*) in the Hubei area in 1975, according to detailed Taiwanese intelligence information; see *Gongdang wenti yanjiu*, No. 4 (Oct. 1975), pp. 89–90.

78 For the "Golden Monkey," see Leijonhufvud, *Going Against the Tide*, pp. 192–201; *Zhanwang*, No. 299 (16 July 1974), pp. 9–14. The term "political prisoner" (sometimes also rendered as *zhengzhi anfan*) only appears in individual official documents. One such instance is a 1979 circular on food rationing in lockups for prisoners awaiting trial. See Gonganbu zhengce falü yanjiushi (ed.), *Zhifa shouce* (Manual of Law Enforcement) (Beijing: Qunzhong chubanshe, 1982), pp. 110–12.

79 For Hu Ping's political thinking see his contributions in *Qishi Niandai* (The Seventies), Hong Kong, No. 134 (March 1981), pp. 72–79; No. 35 (April 1981), pp. 57–65; No. 136 (May 1981), pp. 67–72; No. 137 (June 1981), pp. 67–75. Moreover, see Hu Ping, "Wo weishenme xie 'Lun yanlun ziyou'" ("Why I have written 'On the Freedom of Speech'"), in Li Shaomin (ed.), *Dalu zhishifenzi lun zheng zhi, shehui, jingji* (Taipei: Guiguan tushu

gongsi, 1988), pp. 31–66. He Baogang, "Democracy as Viewed by Three Chinese Liberals: Wei Jingsheng, Hu Ping, and Yan Jiaqi," *China Information*, Vol. VI, No. 2 (Autumn 1991), pp. 23–43.

80 One of the most famous underground poets of the seventies was Shi Zhi alias Guo Lusheng, who was one of the founding members of the United Action Committee set up in 1966. On underground literature during the Cultural Revolution era, see Wu Meng (ed.), *Gan you ge yin dong di ai: Wenhua da geming hou zhongguo qingnian shiwenxuan* (If We Have the Courage to Recite Our Songs, the Earth Will Mourn: An Anthology of Post-Cultural Revolutionary Poems and Writings of Young Chinese) (Hong Kong: Qishi niandai, 1974). Ding Wangyi, "Zhongguo dalu de dixia wenxue" ("Underground Literature from Mainland China"), *Huanghe*, No. 3 (April 1977), pp. 8–20; No. 4 (September 1977), pp. 29–31; No. 5 (March 1978), pp. 8–24. Perry Link, "Hand-Copied Entertainment Fiction from the Cultural Revolution," in Perry Link et al. (eds.), *Unofficial China: Popular Culture and Thought in the People's Republic* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1989), pp. 17–36. Claude Widor (ed.), *Zhongguo minban kanwu huibian/Documents on the Chinese Democratic Movement, 1978–1980*, Vol. 2, (Paris/Hong Kong: L'École des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales/Observer Publ., 1984), pp. 61 and 83–84. A rich new source is Yang Jian (ed.), *Wenhua da geming zhong de dixia wenxue* (Underground Literature of the Cultural Revolution) (Chaohua Press: Beijing, 1993). On the seventies, see esp. pp. 81–137, 149–98 and 291–322. Unfortunately, the book was obviously put together in a hurry and suffers from a rather chaotic style of editing.

81 Wu Meng, *Gan youge*, p. 140.

82 Ding Wangyi, "Zhongguo dalu de dixia wenxue," part III (March 1978), p. 22.

83 Interviews with participants in the Beijing demonstrations; Tong Huaizhou (ed.), *Bingchen Qingming jianwenlu* (Eyewitness Accounts of Qingming, 1976) (Beijing: Gongren chubanshe, 1979), pp. 124–125; Anne F. Thurston, *Enemies of the People* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988), pp. 5–6 and 27.

84 Tong Huaizhou, *Tiananmen shiwenxuan*, Vol. 1, pp. 63, 132, and 513.

85 Tong Huaizhou, *Tiananmen shiwenxuan*, Vol. 1, pp. 526 and 551; Vol. 2, pp. 383–384.

86 See *Mingbao Yuekan* (Mingbao Monthly), No. 5 (1976), pp. 94–104; Yan Jiaqi et al., *Siwu yun dong jishi* (A Factual Record of the April Fifth Movement) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1979), p. 59. *Bingchen Qingming jishi* (A Documentation of Qingming 1976) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1980), p. 259. Interview with a key activist involved in the Nanjing incident who had raised the issue of wages in his public speeches during the 1976 Qingming demonstrations.

87 See Wang Hongzhi, *Tiananmen guangchang geming jianshi* (A Short History of Revolutionary Events on Tiananmen Square) (Shanghai: Renmin chubanshe, 1979), pp. 90–91. On-the-spot recordings sent by Beijing Municipal Service, 22 November 1978, in FBIS-CHI, 24 November 1978, E 10–12.

88 For an interesting assessment of the Lin Biao affair's impact on popular attitudes towards Mao, see Hu Ping, "Wo weishenme xie 'Lun yanlun ziyou'," p. 40.

89 Tong Huaizhou, *Tiananmen shiwenxuan*, Vol. 1, p. 461; Vol. 2, p. 235.

90 Roger Garside, *Coming Alive. China after Mao* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981), p. 118.

91 Tong Huaizhou, *Weida de siwu yundong*, p. 96. The official media used the poem to establish a link with Lin Biao's conspiracy plans ("Project 571") which had called for the "Qin Shihuang of our epoch" and his "social feudalism" to be toppled. An interesting analysis of "Project 571" is contained in Moody, *Opposition and Dissent*, pp. 218–21.

92 In 1972, a booklet entitled *Qin Shihuang* praising the historical tyrant had been distributed in Shanghai. See also pertinent articles in *Hongqi* (Red Flag), No. 10 (1973). The



Qin Shihuang analogy is analyzed in Barnoun and Yu Changgen, *Ten Years of Turbulence*, pp. 28–29 and 256.

93 After years of intra-Party bickering, Shi Yunfeng was eventually posthumously rehabilitated in 1980. See *Chunfeng Huayu ji*, Vol. 2, pp. 392–406. Wang Hsiao-hsien, “‘Shi Yunfeng shijian’ de zhen xiang” (“The Truth about the ‘Shi Yunfeng incident’”), *Gongdang wenji yanjiu*, Vol. 6, No. 8 (1980), pp. 62–67. Ma Qibin et al., *Gongchandang zhizheng sishi nian*, p. 455.

94 *Zhonggong nianbao*, 1974, section 2, p. 292.

95 Cf. Stanley Rosen, “Guangzhou’s Democracy Movement,” p. 8.

96 Gao Gao and Yan Jiaqi, *Wen’ge shinian shi*, pp. 586–87.

97 Tong Huaizhou, *Tiananmen shiwenxuan*, Vol. 2, p. 84.

98 *Ibid.*, Vol. 2, pp. 378–79.

99 The preceding section of the poem ambiguously indicates that the target might be the Soviet rulers. See Tong Huaizhou, *Bingchen Qingming jianwenlu*, p. 114; Yan et al., *Siwu yundong jishi*, p. 86.

100 For Liu Shaoqi’s role in shaping the “docile tools” concept in 1958, see Jin Chunming et al. (eds.), “Wen’ge” shiqi guaishi guaiyu (*The Absurdities of the “Cultural Revolution” period*) (Beijing: Qiushi chubanshe, 1989), p. 366. See also the quotations from *Zhongguo qingnian* (*Chinese Youth*), No. 5 (March 1960), pp. 5–6, cited by Moody, *Opposition and Dissent*, pp. 99 and 101.

101 See Heilmann, *Sozialer Protest*, pp. 131–45.

102 Garside, *Coming Alive*, pp. 99–100.

103 See Roderick MacFarquhar, *The Hundred Flowers Campaign and the Chinese Intellectuals* (New York: Octagon, 1974), p. 68; Thurston, *Enemies of the People*, p. 8, respectively.

104 This formula was quoted in a situation report written by the Propaganda Department of Nanjing University in late 1975. *Xinhua Ribao*, Nanjing, 19 December 1977.

105 Forster, *Rebellion and Factionalism*, pp. 186 and 228, confirmed by interviews in Nanjing and Kaifeng.

106 See Heilmann, “Social Context,” *passim*.

107 For a similar assessment see Yang Xiguang, “Yiwei duli zhishifenzi,” pp. 4–6 and 10. See also Hu Ping, “Wo weishenmo xie ‘Lun yanlun ziyou’,” pp. 39–40. Shen Nei, “Cong ‘Siwu’ dao ‘Liusi’” (“From ‘April Fifth’ [1976] to ‘June Fourth’ [1989]”), *Laiyin tongxin* (*Rhine Correspondence*), June 1991, pp. 8–9.

108 These are the words of the dissident Wang Xizhe, cited in Geremie Barmé and John Minford (eds.), *Seeds of Fire: Chinese Voices of Conscience* (Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review, 1986), p. 274.

109 This term was coined by David Goodman, *Beijing Street Voices: The Poetry and Politics of China’s Democracy Movement* (London: Marion Boyars, 1981), p. 129.