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**The Chinese *Nomenklatura* in Transition**

**A Study Based on Internal Cadre Statistics of the  
Central Organization Department of the  
Chinese Communist Party**

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**by**

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
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# The Cadre Hierarchy in the PRC (1997)



CCP: Chinese Communist Party; PRC: People's Republic of China.

\* County leadership/division chief level and above.

\*\* Prefecture leadership/bureau chief level and above.

\*\*\* Provincial leadership/ministerial level and above.

Sources: Internal data collections edited by the CCP Central Organization Department: *Dang de zuzhi gongzuo dashiji, 1993-1997* (Chronicle of the CCP's organizational work, 1993-1997), Beijing, December 1999, p. 428; *Dang Zheng lingdao ganbu tongji ziliao huibian. 1954-1998* (Collection of statistical material on leadership cadres of the party and the state, 1954-1998), Beijing, December 1999, pp.3-4. Modified graphic representation after Jean-Pierre Cabestan, *Le système politique de la Chine populaire*, Paris 1994, p. 393.

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**The Chinese *Nomenklatura* in Transition:  
A Study Based on Internal Cadre Statistics of the Central  
Organization Department of the Chinese Communist Party<sup>1</sup>**

**Introduction**

One essential pillar of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) power is its control over the appointment and removal of political and administrative personnel. The Leninist *nomenklatura* system has been subject to several political disruptions and modifications in the course of PRC history. To this day, however, the CCP strictly adheres to the key Leninist principle: "The Communist Party controls the cadres" (*Dang guan ganbu*).

The *nomenklatura* system basically consists of two elements: a strictly hierarchical list of leadership positions to be filled by the Communist Party, and a second list of those persons suitable to fill the positions in question ("cadre reserve").<sup>2</sup> The collapse of the Communist party states in East and Central Europe and the domestic political crisis of 1989 induced the Chinese leadership to tighten and modernize control over the political and administrative elite. In order to meet the needs of economic modernisation, new criteria for personnel selection as well as new procedures for the promotion and supervision of cadres were introduced.<sup>3</sup> In 1995, the "Temporary Regulations Concerning the Selection and Appointment of Leadership Cadres of the Party and the State" introduced important organizational reforms.<sup>4</sup> These regulations grant party members a broader say in the recommendation, assessment and nomination of leadership cadres. Additionally, they set up high standards for the professional qualification of leadership cadres (a college degree and several years of work experience are normally required). Nevertheless, the CCP Organization Departments did not give up their control power: nominations of candidates for leadership positions must still be checked and approved by these organs.

Until now, studies of the top cadre level in the PRC have been handicapped by incomplete or inaccessible personnel data.<sup>5</sup> This handicap has recently been mitigated. At the end of 1999,

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<sup>1</sup> A German version of this analysis first appeared under the title "Chinas politische Führungsschicht im Wandel: Personalstatistiken der ZK-Organisationsabteilung erstmals zugänglich", in: *China aktuell*, May 2000 (Institute for Asian Affairs, Hamburg).

<sup>2</sup> Two studies by John P. Burns offer an overview of the PRC's *nomenklatura* system: *The Chinese Communist Party's Nomenklatura System: A Documentary Study of Party Control of Leadership Selection, 1979-1984*, Armonk/New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1989, and "Strengthening Central CCP Control of Leadership Selection: The 1990 *Nomenklatura*", in: *The China Quarterly*, No.138 (1994), pp. 458-491.

<sup>3</sup> Two volumes edited by sub-organs of the CCP Central Organization Department contain numerous previously unpublished documents and data: *Ganbu guanli gongzuo wenjian xuanbian* (Selection of documents on cadre management work), Beijing, December 1995; *Dang de zuzhi gongzuo dashiji*, 1993-1997 (Chronicle of the CCP's organization work, 1993-1997), Beijing, December 1999 (both for internal circulation only).

<sup>4</sup> See also Sebastian Heilmann, *Will the Chinese Communist Party Collapse? Political Consequences of Economic Reforms and the Perspectives of Communist Rule in China*, Cologne: Federal Institute of International and Eastern European Studies, 1995, esp. pp.10-12.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. the methodological remarks in Li Cheng's recent study of the political elite, "*Jiang Zemin's Successors: The Rise of The Fourth Generation of Leaders in the PRC*", in: *The China Quarterly*, No.161 (2000), pp.1-40, see esp. pp.9ff.

the Organization Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (below in short: Central Organization Department) for the first time made available extensive personnel statistics which provide detailed information about the changing sociological composition of the Chinese cadre hierarchy in the last five decades: *Dang Zheng lingdao ganbu tongji ziliao huibian, 1954-1998* (Collection of Statistical Material on Leadership Cadres of the Party and the State, 1954-1998), Beijing, December 1999.

The Central Organization Department itself has edited the volume. It has been printed in December 1999 and contains 600 pages mostly with data tables in large format. The edition of cadre statistics under the name of this secretive party organ which manages the cadre dossiers of the entire political elite is highly unusual. The volume is hard to get by on the book market since it is confined to "internal distribution" (*neibu faxing*) and only one thousand copies were printed.

The personnel statistics include detailed chronological data not only for the national but also for the regional and local cadre ranks (subdivided according to hierarchy as well as provinces etc.). It even provides information on the sociological composition of the leadership at the county party committee level through time. Such representative data was completely unavailable by now.

Despite possible inaccuracies, the Central Organization Department's statistics are undoubtedly the most reliable and most extensive data on leadership personnel to be found in the PRC. Therefore these newly published materials are of outstanding value for the analysis of the Chinese political and administrative elite.

Some new information and insights that can be drawn from the Central Organization Department's data will be presented briefly in the following sections.<sup>6</sup>

### **1. The expansion of cadre ranks in the first years of communist rule (1949-1956)**

Immediately after the foundation of the People's Republic of China the number of cadres started to rise fast due to great personnel shortages. In 1952, 27,000 leadership cadres (county leadership level or division chief level and above) were appointed, 55,000 in 1954, 43,000 in 1955 and even 163,000 in 1956. 43% of all county-level party secretaries and county leaders of the year 1954 had been promoted to these positions within a single year. Most of these new leaders were young and did not have a lot of working experience. The expansion of the cadre force was interrupted by recurring campaigns, particularly in 1951/52, when the "Three Anti Campaign" against corruption, waste, and bureaucratization led to extensive purges.

### **2. The cadre system from the "Great Leap Forward" to the "Cultural Revolution" (1957-1966)**

Between 1957 and 1966 political unsteadiness and economic setbacks prevailed due to the "Great Leap Forward" and campaigns against "rightist deviations". Therefore the number of leadership cadres only increased with an average yearly growth-rate of 2.7% in this period, much slower than in the preceding years. The demand for new personnel was stronger from

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<sup>6</sup> The following account relies on the introductory chapter which precedes the cadre statistics of the CCP Organization Department. Additionally, selected personnel data from the statistical chapters is presented (cf. the tables in the appendix to this paper).

1957 to 1959, when the cadre force expanded by 5.9% annually. Personnel bottlenecks frequently arose as a result of political purges. Following the Lushan conference of 1959, which had seen an open clash within the central party leadership, numerous cadres were removed from their leadership positions as "rightists".

From 1960 to 1962, the number of leadership cadres grew only by 1.1% per annum. At that time many cadres were sent down to work at lower levels, especially in small peasant villages. In 1960 around 1,018,000 cadres (ordinary lower-level cadres and leadership cadres) had been sent down (*xiafang*) to the countryside. Statistical data from 12 provinces indicates that 8.4% of those sent to rural areas were experienced officials who had worked at the county leadership level and above. With regard to the national political system, this data suggests that up to 86,000 leadership cadres were sent down to rural areas in 1960 alone.

As a consequence, there was a lack of qualified personnel at many levels. Leadership positions could not be properly filled. At the central government level, for example, 31% of the bureau chief positions in state commissions and ministries remained unoccupied. At the provincial level, 27% of leadership positions in the departments of provincial party committees or provincial governments were vacant. A decision adopted at the 10th plenum of the 8th Central Committee in 1962 on the exchange of leadership cadres at all levels was related to this problem.

In the period from 1963 to 1965 the number of cadres grew again more steadily at an average 2.2% per annum. Following a suggestion by Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi, a group of younger cadres was promoted to leadership positions, while numerous university graduates were sent down to rural areas in order to "toughen up".

### **3. Leadership cadres during the "Cultural Revolution" (1966-1976)**

During the "Cultural Revolution" with its intra-party conflicts and arbitrary removals of cadres from office as "capitalist roaders", the cadre control exerted by the CCP's Organization Departments suffered severe disruptions. In the view of the Central Organization Department, numerous unscrupulous careerists managed to take advantage of the chaotic circumstances to climb into high positions. The regular criteria for cadre promotion were pushed aside.

The system of cadre files (personnel dossiers), however, was apparently never dismantled completely, not even during the high tide of the "Cultural Revolution" (1966-1968). With gradual political consolidation at the end of the 1970s, it became clear that the Organization Departments could still muster substantial information about the behaviour of leadership cadres in preceding years. The cadre system had been disrupted during the "ten years of turmoil", but had not completely ceased to work. This points to the important fact that the control instruments of the central party leadership (and this also applies to the different intelligence services) had never broken down entirely, as western research conventionally has it.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Michael Schoenhals rightly criticizes assessments that overstate the breakdown of the party center's authority during the "Cultural Revolution". See his "Is the Cultural Revolution Really Necessary?", paper presented at the international conference "Was the Chinese Revolution Really Necessary? Interpreting Fifty Years of The PRC", Institute of Asian Affairs, Hamburg, September 1999 (conference volume forthcoming).

#### **4. The cadre stratum after the "Cultural Revolution" and during the reform era (1976-1998)**

After the death of Mao Zedong and the ensuing elimination of leading "Cultural Revolution" radicals, the CCP center devoted a lot of energy to rebuilding a regular cadre system. Many cadres lacked professional knowledge of administration and management. In 1980 only 43% of the leaders of central government organs had a college degree, while 24% had only attended junior high school. Only 16% (4% and 3% respectively) of the full members of party committees at the provincial level (prefecture and county level) held a college degree. Furthermore the average age was rather high and a substantial proportion of leadership cadres could not work fully because of bad health. The CCP center therefore decided to implement a series of adjustment measures.

##### **4.1 Rectifying "Cultural Revolution" activists and straightening the *nomenklatura***

After the CCP's central leadership had given instructions on rectifying and purging "Cultural Revolution" activists in December 1982, investigations took place within the cadre ranks on a nation-wide scale. Altogether 138,000 persons were targeted by internal investigations that lasted until July 1987. 5,540 persons were identified as main culprits of violent and criminal incidents during the "Cultural Revolution", another 38,500 persons were proven guilty of severe misdemeanours. These persons were removed from leadership positions.

At the same time numerous cadre veterans were rehabilitated politically and reinstated into leadership functions they had lost during the "Cultural Revolution", when they had fallen out of favour. In 1979 alone, about 40% of positions on the county and prefecture leadership levels were reshuffled. In addition, 185 leadership positions at the ministerial level (leadership bodies at central government organs had been grossly inflated in the preceding years) were abolished between 1980 and 1982. This means that 65% of previously available top-level cadre positions in the central government were, at least temporarily, eliminated from the CCP's *nomenklatura* (see table 5).

##### **4.2 Rejuvenating the cadre ranks and enhancing professional qualification**

In order to reduce the average age and enhance the professional qualification of the cadres, veteran cadres were gradually replaced by younger officials. Between 1982 and 1988, more than 550,000 new cadres were promoted to leadership positions. Simultaneously, 2,870,000 ordinary and leadership cadre veterans went into retirement. Through these measures the average age could be lowered from originally 62 years to 56 years on the provincial leadership level. The share of leadership cadres recruited after the revolution (i.e. those aged younger than 55 years) rose from 15% to 49%. The share of college graduates also increased sharply from formerly 20% to 43%.

##### **4.3 Recruiting highly qualified reserve cadres**

In May 1983, the party center demanded that more reserve cadres be cultivated in order to make sure that enough young people could be recruited for leadership positions. By 1986, the Central Organization Department had selected one thousand reserve cadres who were supposed to take over leadership positions at the provincial and ministerial level. In order to re-

lieve the shortage of qualified personnel on lower administrative levels and to reduce the high average age of cadres in county leaderships, provincial organization departments were ordered to select up to 200 of the best college graduates and send them to work in rural areas. After two or three years of practice, the best among them should be promoted to lower-level leadership positions. Those who would prove their outstanding dedication and capabilities in their new office should be designated as reserve cadres for provincial leadership posts.

By the end of 1985, 12,700 college graduates had been selected for work at the grass roots level. Among these young cadres, 2,800 were given positions in the leading bodies of townships, and about 300 were promoted to positions in county-level leaderships. 1,500 of them were registered as reserve cadres for county-level and prefecture-level leadership organs. In order to regularize recruitment and promotion procedures, the party center gave detailed instructions in a "Circular on the Recruitment of Cadres to Be Carried Out Strictly According to the Party's Guidelines" in January 1986.

#### **4.4 New efforts at tightening cadre control in the wake of political crisis (1989-1992)**

The 1989 urban protest movement posed a heavy challenge to the Chinese Communist Party's *nomenklatura* system. From the perspective of the central leadership, the events had made it clear that many leadership cadres' political and ideological loyalty and party discipline were not reliable. So as to safeguard hierarchical discipline, all leadership cadres were screened under orders from the party center. From September 1989 to February 1990, altogether 38,000 cadres were examined by central party organs, while 370,000 cadres were examined by provincial party organs.

Through these screenings the party center could assess the attitude and performance of leadership cadres during the political crisis. Cadres which had proven to be politically unreliable were subject to disciplinary measures that ranged from intra-party admonitions to the expulsion from the party, removal from office and, in rare cases, formal prosecution. At the same time "good" cadres which had behaved "correctly" were identified and preferentially promoted into leadership positions.

As a consequence of the political crisis, the CCP center redefined the criteria for cadre recruitment. Political reliability, leadership qualities as well as practical work experience should weigh heavier in order to counterbalance the criteria of youthfulness and professional qualification that had been emphasized during the eighties. In September 1991 the CCP center issued a "Decision on the Cultivation and Training of Young Cadres". Deficits in the ideological knowledge of younger cadres were supposed to be rectified within five years. From 1991 to 1995, the Central Organization Department published several detailed guidelines on the training of leadership cadres.

Reforms of the *nomenklatura* system itself were tackled simultaneously. Following a decision of the Politburo in July 1990, rules for the regular exchange of leadership cadres in party and state organs were introduced. 25,400 leadership cadres were sent to different appointments as a result of the new rotation rules in 1992 alone.

#### **4.5 Recruiting and supervising leadership cadres in the context of a "socialist market economy" 1992-1998**

Following the official declaration in favour of establishing a "socialist market economy" in 1992, new criteria for the selection of political leadership personnel were required. The *nomenklatura* system of the CCP thus entered a new phase in 1992.

In order to better fulfil the new economic requirements, a much larger number of young, well-trained junior cadres were promoted to top positions. Between 1992 and 1998, 321,600 new leadership cadres (county leadership level and above) were appointed. 60% were younger than 45 years, and 80% had completed university education.

Regular rotation of leadership cadres was now intensified. In the seven years from 1992 to 1998, 218,000 leadership cadres had to take part in the exchanges (among them 14,000 cadres on prefecture leadership or bureau chief level). The consolidation of the reserve cadre system was also pushed forward. In comparison with 1992, the number of reserve cadres had increased by around 77,000 persons in 1998. Supervision and control of leadership cadres were also strengthened; to this end the party central issued detailed directives in 1993 and 1997.

Recruitment and promotion of leadership cadres were now handled more systematically and according to stricter rules. In February 1995 the party center issued the "Temporary Regulations Concerning the Selection and Appointment of Leadership Cadres of the Party and the State". Recruitment for leadership positions through intra-party competition (*jingzheng shanggang*) and transparent criteria for promotion did however only slowly gain ground. The CCP Organization Department states that nation-wide more than 200,000 leadership positions were filled according to the new, more transparent rules until August 1998. But, remarkably, only 700 positions on the prefecture leadership/bureau chief level were included in the experiments with the new procedures.

Furthermore, the number of cadres who were degraded due to lack of qualification, malfeasance or organizational necessities is said to have increased. In the course of the reorganization of the central government since March 1998, altogether 7,800 leadership cadres in central government organs (from division chief level up) had to leave their positions. 17 ministerial-level cadres were moved to the lower rank of deputy minister.

### **5. The Central Organization Department's view of the modernization of the *nomenklatura* system**

In the view of the CCP's Central Organization Department, the cadre statistics confirm the successful modernization of the cadre system since 1981 in the following ways.

#### **5.1 More balanced composition and higher professional qualification of cadres**

By the end of 1998 there were altogether 508,000 leadership cadres (cadres from the county-level leadership up) in party and state organs. 14.4% of these were female, 7.5% belonged to ethnic minorities, and 4.7% were not members of the CCP (cf. Table 2 in the appendix).

- *Hierarchy*: The ratio between leadership cadres on the different hierarchical levels of the *nomenklatura* system (provincial leadership/ministerial level, prefectural leadership level and county leadership level) was 1: 15: 182 (cf. Table 1).
- *Age*: Around 5% of leadership cadres were 35 years old or younger, 33% were 36-45 years old, 41% were 46-54 years old and 22% were older than 55 years (cf. Table 3). In comparison to 1981, the share of cadres who were younger than 35 years has increased by about 4%, while the share of 36-45 year old cadres increased by 23% until 1998.
- *Education*: 3% of leadership cadres had completed a postgraduate degree, 31% held a university degree and 47% a college degree. The share of cadres with college education therefore increased by around 64% from 1981 to 1998. 15% of the leadership cadres held a technical college degree or had secondary education. Only 4% had merely completed the lower grade of junior high school.

## 5.2 Enhancing the quality of personnel in party and state leadership bodies

By the end of 1998, 8% of the cadres in party and state leadership bodies (*Dang Zheng ling-dao banzi*) at the provincial, prefecture and county levels were female, and 13% belonged to ethnic minorities. In government leadership bodies, 6% of the cadres were *not* members of the CCP.

- In leadership bodies at the provincial level, around 7% of the cadres were up to 45 years old, 48% were 46-54 years old and 45% were 55 years old or older. 96% held a degree.
- At the prefectural level, 5% of the members of leadership bodies were up to 40 years old, 50% were between 41 and 50 years old and 45% were older than 50 years. 94% held a degree.
- At the county level, 10% of the members of leadership bodies were under 35 years old, 57% were between 36 and 45 years old and 33% were 46 years or older. 89% held a degree.

In comparison to 1981, the average age at the provincial, prefectural and county leadership level had sunk by 9 years, 7 years and 6 years respectively by 1998. The share of college graduates at these levels increased by around 77%, 88% and 82% respectively.

## 5.3 Systematizing the selection of reserve cadres

By the end of 1998 there were altogether 192,000 reserve cadres for provincial, prefectural and county leadership levels. More than 800 of them were designated for the provincial leadership/ministerial level, 23,000 for the prefectural leadership/bureau chief level. 18% of the reserve cadres were female, and 11% belonged to ethnic minorities. 8% were not members of the CCP. 91% of the reserve cadres held a degree. According to the Central Organization Department, 90% of the reserve cadres were less than 45 years old, and 31% were even younger than 35 years.

## 5.4 Unresolved problems within the cadre system

In its assessment of the present cadre system, the Central Organization Department also points to a number of unresolved problems. The professional qualification of leadership cadres is still not seen as sufficient. The share of cadres on county, prefecture and provincial leadership level with a university degree does not yet meet the standards put forward in the Central Organization Department's cadre development plan for the years 1998-2003. According to these guidelines, all cadres on county and prefectural leadership level should at least hold a college degree, while cadres at the provincial leadership level should hold a university degree. This has not yet been accomplished.

Furthermore, the age structure (i.e. the share of younger cadres) does not yet meet the envisaged standards either. The share of female leadership cadres is still considered to be too low. And the number of registered reserve cadres does not yet suffice. According to the cadre development plan put forth by the Central Organization Department, two reserve cadres are to be kept ready for each regular post from the county-level leadership up. This was not yet realized at the end 1998. The ratio between posts and reserve cadres on the prefecture and county leadership level was 1: 0.6 and 1: 1.2 respectively in 1998.

## 6. Conclusion

The Chinese Communist Party's control over political and administrative leadership personnel is still based upon Leninist mechanisms. The *nomenklatura* system remains the basis for the CCP's hierarchy and political authority. The *nomenklatura* power of the CCP has not only served to maintain the authoritarian political system. It has also proven indispensable for putting through economic structural reforms that were favored by the central leadership but hurt regional political and economic interests.

The tax reforms and the anti-inflation measures from 1993 to 1996 as well as the reorganization of the financial system from 1997 to 2000 were achieved with the help of political pressure that can be exercised through the personnel and organizational power of the party center towards regional leaderships.<sup>8</sup>

From this point of view, the Leninist *nomenklatura* system has paradoxically often assisted in implementing structural reforms that accelerated China's turning away from the old socialist economic system. It is therefore essential to further explore the system of cadre recruitment and cadre control so as to gain a better understanding of the political foundations of economic restructuring in China.

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<sup>8</sup> For the role of Leninist institutions in inflation control, see Huang Yasheng, *Inflation and Investment Controls in China: The Political Economy of Central-Local Relations during the Reform Era*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996; see also Sebastian Heilmann, *The Politics of Economic Reform in China and Russia*, Hamburg: Institute for Asian Affairs 2000. For intra-party reorganization measures which preceded the recent financial system reforms, see: Organization Department of the CCP Central Financial Work Committee (ed.), *Dang de zuzhi gongzuo shiyong shouce* (Practical manual of CCP organization work), Beijing 1999, esp. pp. 90-205 and 292-296.

## Appendix:

### Selected Data on Leadership Cadres in the PRC

Tables 1-6 apply to leadership cadres (i.e. leading officials of county leadership level and above) in organs of the CCP, the People's Congresses, the People's Governments, the Political Consultative Conference, the judicial organs, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, the Communist Youth League, the All-China Women's Federation, as well as other state-controlled associations.

**Table 1: Hierarchy of leadership cadres, 1980-1998**

end of year	total number of leadership cadres	in central party or state organs	provincial leadership/ministerial level and above	in central organs	prefectural leadership/bureau chief level	in central organs	County leadership/division chief level	in central organs
1980	<b>167,650</b>	17,498	<b>1,882</b>	916	<b>23,483</b>	4,984	<b>142,285</b>	11,598
1985	<b>259,596</b>	30,056	<b>2,150</b>	972	<b>27,906</b>	6,682	<b>229,540</b>	22,402
1990	<b>344,785</b>	29,274	<b>2,261</b>	868	<b>30,259</b>	6,138	<b>312,265</b>	22,268
1995	<b>445,286</b>	43,322	<b>2,459</b>	887	<b>35,620</b>	7,101	<b>407,207</b>	35,334
1998	<b>508,025</b>	41,689	<b>2,562</b>	888	<b>39,108</b>	6,580	<b>466,355</b>	34,221

Source: Compiled from *Dang Zheng lingdao ganbu tongji ziliao huibian*, p.3.

**Table 2: Leadership cadres according to gender, ethnic and political affiliation**

end of year	total number	share of female cadres (%)	share of ethnic minority cadres (%)	share of CCP members (%)	share of members of "Democratic Parties" (%)
1981	<b>183,927</b>	7.44	7.10	96.92	0.57
1985	<b>259,596</b>	8.16	7.98	95.32	0.63
1990	<b>344,785</b>	7.92	7.44	96.30	0.79
1995	<b>445,286</b>	12.24	7.47	95.38	0.84
1998	<b>508,025</b>	14.39	7.50	95.30	0.99

Source: Compiled from *Dang Zheng lingdao ganbu tongji ziliao huibian*, p.3.

**Table 3: Leadership cadres according to professional qualification and age**

end of year	total number	academic degree (%)	lower grade of junior high (%)	35 years old or younger (%)	36 to 45 years old (%)
1981	<b>183,927</b>	16.38	57.78	1.11	9.44
1985	<b>259,596</b>	39.05	30.58	3.91	36.29
1990	<b>344,785</b>	52.06	19.22	3.60	23.87
1995	<b>445,286</b>	70.78	7.96	4.16	30.43
1998	<b>508,025</b>	80.53	4.17	5.42	33.43

Source: Compiled from *Dang Zheng lingdao ganbu tongji ziliao huibian*, p.4.

**Table 4: Leadership cadres (provincial leadership/ministerial level and above) according to gender, ethnic and political affiliation**

end of year	total number	share of female cadres (%)	share of ethnic minorities (%)	share of CCP members (%)	share of members of "Democratic Parties" (%)
1981	<b>1,791</b>	3.80	7.54	90.73	6.09
1985	<b>2,150</b>	4.93	8.74	89.63	6.42
1990	<b>2,261</b>	6.19	1.26	88.06	8.18
1995	<b>2,459</b>	7.08	11.96	89.59	6.71
1998	<b>2,562</b>	7.22	11.44	87.51	9.25

Source: Compiled from *Dang Zheng lingdao ganbu tongji ziliao huibian*, p.4.

**Table 5: Leadership cadres in the rank of ministers and deputy ministers in the central government, 1954-1998**

end of year	total number	share of female cadres (%)	share of ethnic minorities (%)	CCP members (%)	academic degree (%)	45 years old or younger (%)	46 to 50 years old (%)	average age (years)
1954	<b>208</b>	3.37	1.44	78.85	69.71	37.98	n.a.	n.a.
1964	<b>398</b>	1.76	1.26	89.70	56.28	2.51	n.a.	n.a.
1980*	<b>577</b>	2.95	1.21	99.48	36.22	1.21	1.39	63.60
1990	<b>219</b>	5.94	6.39	97.26	87.67	0.91	8.22	57.02
1998	<b>215</b>	7.44	3.72	97.67	99.07	3.26	5.58	56.09

\* No data available for the years 1965-1979.

Source: Compiled from *Dang Zheng lingdao ganbu tongji ziliao huibian*, p.12.

**Table 6: Leadership cadres in CCP Committees at the provincial level: number, gender, ethnic affiliation, education and age, 1954-1998**

end of year	total number	share of female cadres (%)	share of ethnic minorities (%)	academic degree (%)	average age (years)
1954	<b>93</b>	n.a.	5.38	46.24	n.a.
1964	<b>169</b>	1.78	5.33	35.50	n.a.
1974	<b>463</b>	7.34	6.48	n.a.	53.98
1980	<b>509</b>	3.93	7.66	15.52	61.35
1990	<b>307</b>	4.89	10.10	70.68	53.93
1998	<b>389</b>	6.17	12.08	86.07	54.18

Source: Compiled from *Dang Zheng lingdao ganbu tongji ziliao huibian*, pp.13-15.

**Table 7: State and Party Cadres in the PRC (1997)**

<b>total number of cadres</b>	<b>40,190,000</b>	<b>100%</b>
lower-level cadres	39,697,700	98.8%
leadership cadres	492,300	1.2%
cadres in party and state organs	6,940,000	17.3%
cadres in state-owned enterprises	14,820,000	36.9%
cadres in other state-controlled units	18,427,000	45.8%
CCP members among cadres	15,273,000	38.0%
non-CCP cadres	24,917,000	62.0%
[members of „Democratic Parties“ among cadres]	[224,000]	[0.6%]
female cadres	13,838,000	34.4%
Ethnic minority cadres	2,684,000	6.7%
cadres with academic degree	17,730,000	44.1%
younger than 45 years	30,416,000	75.7%
older than 55 years	2,419,000	6.0%
<b>cadres (total number) as percentage of entire population</b>	<b>3.33%</b>	
<b>leadership cadres as percentage of entire population</b>	<b>0.04%</b>	

Source: Personnel statistics of the CCP Central Organization Department, cited from: CCP Central Organization Department (ed.), *Dang de zuzhi gongzuo dashiji, 1993-1997* (Chronicle of the CCP's organizational work, 1993-1997), Beijing, December 1999, p. 428. Year-end data.

**Table 8: CCP Membership (end of 1997)**

<b>total number of CCP members</b>	<b>60,410,000</b>	<b>100%</b>
female members	9,830,000	16.3%
ethnic minority members	3,640,000	6.0%
younger than 35 years	14,070,000	23.3%
members with academic degree	10,110,000	16.7%
newly recruited in 1997	2,350,000	3.9%
members lost in 1997 (death etc.)	569,000	0.9%
expelled from the party	27,987	0.05%
subjected to disciplinary measures	96,106	0.2%
<b>CCP members as percentage of entire population</b>	<b>5.01%</b>	

Source: Personnel statistics of the CCP Central Organization Department, cited from: CCP Central Organization Department (ed.): *Dang de zuzhi gongzuo dashiji, 1993-1997* (Chronicle of the CCP's organizational work, 1993-1997), Beijing, December 1999, p. 428. Year-end data.